Report shows many voting problems from 2004 still unresolved

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Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004? October 12, 2006 Authors: Melissa Riess & Tova Wang The Century Foundation Rob Randhava The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights Barbara Burt Common Cause Matt Shaffer Common Cause Stephen Thomas Steigleder

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY With the critical mid-term elections weeks away from our publication date, this report looks at some of the serious problems that marred the 2004 presidential election and asks: are we any better off today than we were two years ago? The authors of this report – The Century Foundation, Common Cause, and The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights – are uniquely qualified to answer that question. The three organizations did intensive monitoring of the 2004 elections and held a conference including several of the other major monitoring organizations in December of that year. They reported their findings in: “Voting in 2004: A Report to the Nation on America’s Election Process,” published in December 2004. ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

This follow-up report explores whether a sampling of 10 states with a history of various election problems and potentially close races – Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin – have taken steps to address the concerns addressed in our foundational report. The findings of our report on the whole are troubling. Some states have made it harder to register to vote rather than easier. This is critical because problems with voter registration were among the most common complaints of voters in 2004. Another critical problem from 2004 – long lines for voters – is likely to recur because few states have dealt with the issue. New voter ID laws in certain states are likely to disenfranchise voters, and only one state has acted aggressively to address voter intimidation tactics. ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

 

Select Findings • Even though our groups and others have identified voter registration rules and requirements as one of the biggest barriers to voting, some states have made it more rather than less difficult to register to vote. For example, Arizona’s new law requiring voters to prove citizenship in order to register represents a huge new barrier to voter participation. In many states, there is no system for promptly notifying a voter if his registration application is missing information necessary for him to be registered to vote, so that by the time Election Day arrives, it is too late for him to amend or complete his application and he is thus disenfranchised. New restrictions on third party  voter registration drives in Florida and Ohio threaten to diminish voter participation. Some states continue to ignore the National Voter Registration Act’s requirements that government agencies provide voter registration materials. In May 2006, the National Voting Rights Institute, the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Project Vote, and Dechert LLP sent a letter to Ohio Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell notifying him of their intent to sue the state for its failure to implement the public assistance provisions of the NVRA. • States should be applauded for making progress in the area of poll worker recruitment. Many of the states studied in our report have been particularly aggressive about recruiting young people to serve as poll workers. • New voter identification laws in half of the states studied present major new barriers to voting. Arizona, Georgia, and Missouri have all enacted disenfranchising voter identification requirements. Ohio and Florida have made their voter identification requirements more restrictive. Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania have all considered stringent voter identification requirements; all of those states could pass such measures in the near future. • Despite the huge incidence in 2004 of misleading fliers and phone calls, only two states, Missouri and Minnesota, have taken an aggressive step to address the problem. Arizona has taken a smaller step to start to address the problem. Bills restricting deceptive practices are pending in two states – Pennsylvania and Ohio – but have not passed. The other states have ignored the problem of deceptive practices. • Partisan pre-election and Election Day challenges to voting eligibility was a major source of controversy and possible voter suppression in 2004. A few states should be praised for taking steps to address this, notably Minnesota and Washington. But most of the states studied have not taken sufficient measures to rein in this deplorable practice, and existing laws are vague enough to be abused again. This is a particular risk in Florida and Pennsylvania. • Despite the huge problems in 2004 with long lines and insufficient and inequitably distributed voting machines, most states continue to employ vague and decentralized standards for voting machine distribution. Unacceptable and disenfranchising long lines threaten to be a problem again in 2006. Neither Florida nor Washington has a formula for determining the number of voting machines for each precinct. Minnesota’s requirements are vague. In Ohio, where voters faced the longest polling lines of any state in 2004, the state passed a law requiring counties that use DREs to provide at least one machine for every 175 voters registered in the previous presidential election. The provision, however, does not take effect until 2013. Pennsylvania has no statutory requirements on machine distribution. Key Recommendations • Remove barriers to registration, such as proof of citizenship requirements and unduly harsh restrictions on third party voter registration drives, and allow more time and information to complete faulty or incomplete forms. Take measures to boost the number of people registered to vote, such as ensuring compliance with the National Voter Registration Act, automatic re-enfranchisement of felons upon completion of incarceration, and Election Day registration. • Limit identification requirements to those mandated by HAVA. More stringent requirements, particularly those that involve government-issued photo ID, disenfranchise too many voters. • State and local governments must enforce existing laws and be more active in prosecuting illegal activities intended to intimidate voters or disrupt voter turnout. • State and local governments must prosecute deceptive practices criminally and have in place emergency procedures that can be implemented immediately to correct the information spread by deliberate misinformation campaigns. • States must establish fair standards for challenges. Such standards should include penalties for overtly partisan, racial, ethnic, or otherwise frivolous challenges. States should enact stringent rules restricting the conditions under which a challenge may be made by a challenger at the polls. States should require pre-election challenges to be filed in advance of Election Day. • Prohibit election administrators from participating in partisan political campaigns; limit elected officials to participation in their own campaigns. The Secretary of State or the county elections director, individuals who are charged with administering and overseeing elections, should not play a role in a partisan campaign for senator or president. Campaign contributions from vendors to election officials, revolvingdoor arrangements by which election officials become lobbyists for vendors, and other such ethical improprieties erode public confidence in elections and weaken election management. • Base allocation standards for voting machines on the latest registration numbers and other factors such as demographic data, the length of the ballot, and recent voter turnout. Long lines at the polling place act as a deterrent to voters, effectively disenfranchising those who cannot afford to wait due to childcare, work, or other time commitments. While some states have made sporadic improvements to their election procedures, none have come close to addressing in full the major problems that plagued the system during the last federal election. Election administrators, elected officials, advocates, and voters have much work to do in the days leading to the 2006 congressional elections and the 2008 presidential election if those elections are to be fair and efficient and earn the trust of the American people. INTRODUCTION On December 7, 2004, The Century Foundation, Common Cause, and The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights sponsored a historic daylong forum entitled “Voting in 2004: A Report to the Nation on America’s Election Process.”1 Although it was generally reported that the election had gone smoothly, those of us most intensely involved in ensuring such an outcome knew that was not the whole story. As a result, our mission on that December day was to gather all of the organizations and experts who were on the ground monitoring the process during the 2004 election to report on the data and information they collected, and in this manner to compile a realistic picture of what transpired in the 2004 presidential election. Subsequently, the three organizations published a report that summarized the comments of the nearly three dozen panelists and the most pressing challenges they faced during the 2004 election cycle. The conference participants detailed numerous instances of voter disenfranchisement that must be addressed, including the following:2 • Voter registration forms were rejected by administrators for overly technical reasons, with little opportunity for the voter to amend his or her form. • Registered voters showed up at a polling place to learn that they were not on the voter registration list due to administrative errors. • Rules and practices for providing and counting provisional ballots were arbitrary and overly restrictive. • Voters were wrongfully and discriminatorily asked to present identification. This most often took place in Asian American, African American, and Native American jurisdictions. • Voting machines broke down and recorded votes inaccurately in some instances. For example, machines in a few jurisdictions switched votes from candidate John Kerry to George Bush and vice-versa. • Poll workers were poorly trained and clearly misinformed, leading to disenfranchisement. • Overt attempts at vote suppression and intimidation occurred, predominantly in African American and Native American jurisdictions. • Voters were subjected to unacceptable wait times to vote, particularly in minority and poor areas and college campuses. • Fliers purposefully disseminating disinformation about election procedures were distributed, most often in minority neighborhoods.   • Election administrators and others abused heretofore scarcely used state statutes to challenge the eligibility of some voters before the election as well as the voting rights of some voters at the polling sites. These efforts were aimed in particular at minority and urban communities. The 2006 midterm elections now upon us beg the question: are we better off today than we were two years ago? This report seeks to answer that question. It explores a sampling of ten states – Pennsylvania, Ohio, Missouri, Michigan, Florida, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Washington, Georgia and Arizona – to determine if and how each have taken steps to address the specific concerns expressed at our 2004 conference. The states chosen have each experienced election problems in recent years; all ten states face close races in 2006, races that are likely to significantly test the system. Our findings are mixed. Disappointingly, in the area of voter registration, states not only did not make the process easier, in some places they made it significantly more difficult. For example, Arizona’s new law requiring voters to prove citizenship in order to register represents a huge new barrier to participation. States like Florida and Ohio have passed laws making it much more difficult to conduct voter registration drives, thus subverting a major way in which voters are brought into the system. With respect to creating and maintaining accurate voter rolls through the statewide database, the states reviewed are working hard to comply with the requirements of the Help America Vote Act. Achieving the goal of accurate lists has continued to be a challenge in some places; in others, such as Michigan, the statewide registration database represents a potential national model. The major problem found with the databases is that some states have established procedural protocols that threaten to disenfranchise a great many voters. Washington State required that the information provided by the voter in his or her voter registration form match precisely – letter for letter, number for number – the information contained in the motor vehicle and social security databases. At the same time, the state of Minnesota was found to have highly effective protocols both for database matching and for notifying voters when there is a mistake or omission on their registration application. Finally, many of the states continue to flaunt provisions of the National Voter Registration Act that require voter registration at public agencies, though it should be noted that Arizona has acted in an exemplary manner in this regard. On the issue of provisional ballots – the “hanging chad” of the 2004 election – progress in the 10 states is yet be determined. Many states will certainly continue the misguided practice of tossing out ballots cast in the wrong polling place or precinct. Moreover, new voter identification requirements in states like Ohio, Missouri and Georgia threaten to increase the number of provisional ballots cast. It is unclear at this time whether states will do a more effective job of counting ballots that should be counted than was the case in 2004. This study finds that Wisconsin and Minnesota employ the best remedy to provisional ballot problems: Election Day registration, which reduces dramatically the need to use provisional ballots at all. We found good progress in the states in the area of poll worker recruitment and training. Of particular note are the number of states that have begun or are expanding use of high school and college students as poll workers, including Michigan, Minnesota and Pennsylvania. States have not done as well, however, in another area of polling place operations: accessibility. While some of the states are using federal funds to improve polling place accessibility, very little legislation has been enacted to enhance accessibility to the polling site. The increase in new, strict voter identification requirements is the most troubling development of the last two years. Stringent voter ID requirements have been found in several studies to be unnecessary and have the effect of disenfranchising many voters, especially the poor, minorities, elderly, young, and those with disabilities.3 Nonetheless, Arizona, Georgia, Missouri, Washington State, and Ohio have all passed new voter identification rules. Many of the other states reviewed are actively considering following suit. Despite the ongoing problem presented by voter intimidation and suppression efforts in many of the states studied, few of the states have taken steps to do more to combat it. For example, only a few of the states have passed bills criminalizing promulgation of false information about voting eligibility and procedures, although legislators in Minnesota and Missouri have passed such a bill. Challenges to voters’ eligibility both before and on Election Day were a major problem in 2004. A couple of states have made an effort to clarify and somewhat narrow the rules for challenging a person’s right to vote. Unfortunately, most of the states have done nothing to rein in this intimidating and  potentially disenfranchising practice. Finally, as was the case in 2004, voting machines remain highly controversial. Concerns about the security and reliability of machines continue to roil many state legislatures; and several organizations have filed lawsuits to prevent states from using electronic voting machines without a voter verified paper trail. Fights have broken out between vendors and states as well as between states and counties over which machines to employ. At the same time, states have continued to largely ignore the problem of too few machines resulting in lengthy wait times. In short, while some states have made modest adjustments, the states studied for this report have much more work to do to improve upon their performances in 2000 and 2004 in order to ensure fair and effective elections in 2006 and 2008. VOTER REGISTRATION Problems with the voter registration process have been and continue to be a significant cause of disenfranchisement.4 Despite widespread voter registration-related problems in 2004, many states have yet to develop a satisfactorily transparent system for tracking, accepting, and rejecting voter registration applications, verifying the eligibility of voters to participate in elections, and notifying voters if their registration information is incomplete. Rejection of voter registration forms Registration forms are often complicated, and instructions for filling them out are unclear. Because of a redundancy in the federal requirements for registration set out in the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA)5 and the National Voter Registration Act of 19936, voters must both check off a box on the application affirming their citizenship and sign a statement affirming their eligibility to vote. Enforcement of these requirements in 2004 varied from state to state, and even from county to county. In some but not all counties in Florida, for example, boards of elections rejected the applications of voters who neglected to check off the citizenship box but signed the oath.7 These checkboxes became the subject of a 2004 lawsuit, Diaz v. Hood, in which voting rights advocates sued Florida Secretary of State Glenda Hood and election administrators in Duval, Orange, Palm Beach, Broward, and Miami-Dade counties, claiming that they had wrongly rejected these forms in violation of the Voting Rights Act and the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.8 The case was dismissed by U.S. District Judge 10   Lawrence King, who ruled that the AFLCIO and the Advancement Project had no legal standing. The case was revived in fall 2005 when the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed King’s ruling. The plaintiff organizations estimate that more than 10,000 voters across the state were unable to vote in 2004 because their registrations had been rejected incorrectly.9 The effect of this problem was particularly compelling in minority communities. In Duval County, for example, almost 45 percent of the rejected forms came from African American registrants. As a result of this controversy, the Florida legislature has passed a law which requires beginning this year that the check boxes must be marked for the registration to be considered complete. The law also removes the affirmation of citizenship in the oath on the registration application.10 Voting rights advocates filed an amended complaint in April 2006.11 The court ruled in June 2006 that the state had not violated the Voting Rights Act and the NVRA by refusing to process the registration applications on which affirmations of eligibility were missing, and ordered the plaintiffs to restate their claims against Florida challenging the state’s failure to notify registrants of information missing from their forms and to give them the opportunity to amend their registrations. The organizations are considering appealing the decision to reject their claims under the VRA and the NVRA.12 Registration has gotten more difficult in Arizona where, as a result of the passage in November 2004 of Proposition 200, voters are now required to provide proof of citizenship with their registration applications. Because Arizona driver’s licenses were issued to non-citizens prior to October 1996, voters wishing to register to vote now must provide a post-October 1996 driver’s license or some other form of proof of citizenship with their registration application in order for their registration form to be accepted. In the months after Proposition 200 was implemented, more than 70% of the registrations initially received in Maricopa County were rejected because they had been submitted without an accepted form of identification or proof of citizenship; in Pima County, where Tucson is located, over 59% of registrations were rejected upon initial receipt.13 Arizona officials have made no plans to alter this registration requirement other than to publicize it.14 This spring, several organizations sued Arizona on the grounds that the State was violating Constitution and the National Voter Registration Act, which requires that the state accept the federal mail-in voter registration form that does 11 not require proof of citizenship. Indeed, the United States Election Assistance Commission, which is responsible for administering the NVRA, issued an opinion stating that the Arizona form contravened the NVRA and advising that Arizona must accept the federal form. The plaintiffs filed to restrain the state from failing to distribute, use, and accept the federal mail registration application prescribed by the Election Administration Commission and to enjoin Proposition 200’s registration requirements. The Judge, however, issued an order denying the application for a restraining order, stating that the plain language clearly allowed the states to require applicants to provide other information, including documents. The case is on appeal.15 Statewide Registration Databases The Help America Vote Act set January 1, 2006 as the final deadline by which all states were to be in compliance with its requirements for statewide voter registration databases. Installing a unified statewide registration database, however, is expensive and complicated, and many states have experienced difficulties in getting localities to comply with HAVA regulations. Missouri is one such state. In November of 2005, the U.S. Justice Department filed a lawsuit against the state of Missouri and Secretary of State Robin Carnahan for failure to maintain updated voter lists and for allowing people who were ineligible to vote to register while improperly purging people who were eligible to vote. The federal suit demanded a statewide study of voter recordkeeping practices.16 According to the Justice Department, almost a third of Missouri’s election precincts had more registered voters than people eligible to vote.17 In response to this lawsuit, the state took action, pressuring localities to comply with the regulations. At the beginning of April 2006, the state was on the verge of implementing its statewide voter registration database, and 115 of the state’s 116 election jurisdictions had taken the necessary steps to comply by November 2005, except for Boone County where County Clerk Wendy Noren insisted that the state pay for the technology updates required to accommodate the new voter registration system. Despite Secretary of State Robin Carnahan’s efforts to make state aid available to the county, the county was still not in compliance by the end of March. Carnahan resorted to legal action, requesting the U.S. Department of Justice to intervene.18 By mid-June, the technical obstacles to Boone County’s database implementation had been 12 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   removed, and the state was brought into compliance with the HAVA requirements.19 Florida was at the top of a list of states with the most inaccurate registration databases. Following the 2004 election, a comparison of the state registration database to the Social Security Administration’s records showed that the state had failed to conduct list maintenance, leaving 64,889 deceased voters on the registration rolls.20 In response, Florida has set up a special Bureau of Voter Registration Services to maintain and oversee the accuracy and integrity of its registration rolls by setting up a special Bureau of Voter Registration Services. One of the Bureau’s primary responsibilities is to ensure the credibility and reliability of information that will be sent to the Supervisors of Elections regarding possible ineligibility due to mental incapacity and felony convictions. These determinations are handled by the Bureau on a case-by-case basis. Bureau staff conducts research using data from the Department of Corrections, the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and the Clerk of the Courts to make each determination.21 Because of this bad publicity regarding the state’s overzealous purging standards, Florida has gone to great lengths to replace these standards with new procedures in which new registrations are verified exhaustively. Some officials are worried that the state has gone too far in the other direction, allowing felons who are ineligible to vote to remain on the lists. Since the state’s new database went into place, state and local officials have been tussling over who has the final say as to whether an individual is eligible to vote. The previous database relied on local officials to maintain a separate list for their locality that was regularly uploaded to a larger statewide list. To come into compliance with HAVA, the state implemented a statewide database that allows voters to submit registration applications at any county elections office. The new database is maintained on the state level. Under current recordkeeping procedure, new registration information must be input into the database and cannot be removed until the Department of Elections has verified that the person is ineligible to vote, even if the locality receives notification from the criminal justice department that the voter is ineligible. The state has been less vigorous about verifying the eligibility of currently registered voters. Florida officials are nervous about the new registration database, which is facing its first major statewide election this year, as in most states.22 Michigan is an example of a state that got ahead of the curve early on, even 13 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   before problems during the 2000 election provoked widespread awareness of the need for databases. In 1994, the state legislature passed a law mandating a centralized voter registration database. The Qualified Voter File (QVF) was operational by the 1998 election cycle, and was populated with every registered elector appearing in the Department of State’s driver’s license/personal identification card file and the voter registration files held by the state’s city and township clerks.23 In a report released prior to the implementation deadline at the beginning of 2006, Electionline.org noted that Michigan’s voter database was “widely considered to be a model list nationally.”24 Recently, however, the state has come under attack for failing to update the database properly. A comparison study between voter registration records and databases with information on felony convictions and the department of vital statistics conducted by a private organization for the Detroit News showed that administrators had failed to take 20,000 deceased voters off the registration rolls and that there were over 100,000 wrong addresses on the Detroit rolls alone. There is no evidence to suggest voter fraud in Detroit or anywhere else in Michigan, but local clerks are working to clean the records at the orders of Secretary of State Terri Lynn Land.25 Michigan’s localities have been using HAVA funds to purge obsolete records from the QVF by sending new voter ID cards to registered voters. If the card is returned “Undeliverable” a confirmation notice is mailed to the registered voter’s last known address on file. If there is no response, the voter must cast a ballot in an election during the next two federal election cycles or be removed from the database. At this point, 169,000 records have been tagged although none has been deleted because the requisite two federal elections have not passed. Wisconsin experienced similar problems with accuracy in its registration database. Milwaukee Mayor Tom Barrett ordered a purge of the city’s registration records in January 2006 in response to pressure from the state for not meeting the HAVA implementation deadline. According to Barrett, Milwaukee’s database contained between 75,000 and 100,000 inaccurate records,26 which have since been cleaned. Part of the problem was that the new statewide database takes much longer to respond than the system the state used before it came into compliance with HAVA. According to one election official, it took one minute to enter a new voter into the old registration database, whereas now it takes four minutes to enter a name, and the new system does not pro- 14 According to one election official, it took one minute to enter a new voter into the old registration database, whereas now it takes four minutes to enter a name, and the new system does not process absentee registrations. Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   cess absentee registrations.27 The state announced in August that while the database would be used by “almost all” Wisconsin municipalities in the September 12, 2006 primary and the November 7, 2006 general election, due to technical difficulties it would not be able to compare the voter database to the state Department of Transportation driver’s license file or to the records of the Department of Corrections. There were further concerns that the state database would not be fully operative this fall because of the extensive training process required for local election officials. Additional delays resulted from the state’s difficulties with Accenture, the software development firm it hired to design the database.28 However, despite these problems, the system is now fully up and running in all jurisdictions. The State Elections Board has provided all county and municipal clerks with felon and death records to enable them to identify ineligible voters before Election Day and to identify ineligible voters who register to vote at the polling place on Election Day.29 The 2004 gubernatorial election in Washington was a particularly effective illustration of the need for more precise recordkeeping procedures. The election, one of the closest in U.S. history, revealed that hundreds of former felons in Washington had been able to register and to cast ballots despite laws and procedures intended to prevent them from doing so. In Washington, a convicted felon is not allowed to vote while he or she is on probation, parole, or in prison, and must have completed his or her sentence requirements, paid all court-related fees, and had his or her right to vote restored by the state in order to obtain a “Certificate of Discharge” which is required for a former felon to have his or her civil rights restored.30 In response to the revelation that former felons – most unaware that they were not eligible to vote – had been able to vote in 2004, the legislature made some reforms regarding recordkeeping and the processes whereby the state’s registration database is updated. The Enhancing Voter Registration Recordkeeping Act requires the Secretary of State to coordinate with other recordkeeping agencies, including the Department of Corrections, the Washington State Patrol, and the Office of the Administrator for the Courts.31 Additionally, the law requires quarterly screening of the registration database to purge it of ineligible voters, such as felons, noncitizens, persons designated as legally incompetent, underage, or deceased. The law also calls for more explicit notification 15 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   at the time of conviction that voting rights have been suspended.32 Most other states automatically restore the civil rights of people who have completed their sentences, cutting down on the substantial paperwork required to restore voting rights, and making maintenance of voter rolls easier. With this in mind, the ACLU recently challenged Washington’s complex re-enfranchisement rules. According to the organization, Under the state law challenged in the ACLU lawsuit, individuals who have finished their prison terms are not allowed to vote until they completely satisfy a growing number of fines and other financial obligations. The “legal financial obligations” can include docket and filing fees, court costs, restitution, and costs of incarceration. Interest on these court-imposed assessments accrues at the exorbitant rate of 12 percent a year. According to Washington’s statistics, more than 90 percent of felony defendants are indigent at the time of charging. It is no surprise that many ex-felons find it difficult to pay these financial assessments upon release. The problem is widespread and hits people of color especially hard. Overall, more than 250,000 people in Washington cannot vote because of a prior felony conviction. Disenfranchisement affects about 3.7 percent of eligible voters in Washington – almost double the national average. And, given the racial disparity in Washington’s incarceration rate, the state disenfranchises almost 25 percent of all voting-age African- American males. In March, King County Superior Court Judge Michael Spearman struck down the Washington law that denies the right to vote to thousands of ex-felons solely because they owe court-imposed fines. The case is on appeal. The ACLU is also working on legislation that will restore ex-felons’ rights to vote when they have completed their prison terms and community supervision.33 Verification The procedure for verifying a voter’s identifying information varies widely from state to state. Some states, such as Arizona, have an “exact match” standard, in which the information provided by the voter on his or her registration application must match exactly with records in the state’s motor vehicle department or Social Security databases. Verification systems such as these can disenfranchise voters as a result of errors or changes to these 16 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   databases. Arizona also experienced problems in 2004 when voters tried to register using the state’s new online registration system, which rejected all applications of registrants who had changed their names or used their married name to register. The state is working to fix the glitches in the online registration system to prevent this problem from recurring in 2006, but has made no move to change the exact match system used for verifying registrations that are submitted in paper form. Exact match verification systems are also more susceptible to the inevitable human error that occurs in the process of transcribing registration information from the paper applications into the electronic registration database. Despite initial technical problems, online registration is a strong possibility for eliminating this form of human error from the registration process. The Arizona online registration system, the first in the country, was viewed as mostly successful. Between January 1, 2004 and October 4, 2004 (the registration deadline), 226,187 registrations were filed online, 21,100 of which were submitted on October 4, according to Deputy Secretary of State Kevin Tyne.34 In Washington a coalition of groups including the Washington Association of Churches, ACORN of Washington, Washington Citizen Action, and many Chinese, Korean, and Filipino community groups sued the state recently, challenging its “exact match” standard, also known as a “no match, no vote”, standard, which requires that the information a voter provides on a voter registration application exactly match the information on record in other government databases in order to successfully register to vote. After they are notified that their registration has been rejected, voters have 45 days to verify their identity. Community groups are concerned that the policy has a disparate effect on members of ethnic groups whose names are more frequently reversed, misspelled, and prone to multiple English spellings, as well as on married women who take their husbands’ names or hyphenate their names, and people with names containing apostrophes and other kinds of punctuation.35 The “no match, no vote” standard has the potential, officials conservatively estimate, of impacting at least 88,000 voter registration forms in the months between now and the 2006 midterm elections.36 In August, a federal judge issued a ruling preventing the state from enforcing the law, which took effect on January 1, 2006.37 Until recently, Pennsylvania also had an exact match standard, but has revised its matching protocols to prevent unwar- 17 The “no match, no vote” standard has the potential, officials conservatively estimate, of impacting at least 88,000 voter registration forms in the months between now and the 2006 midterm elections. Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   ranted disenfranchisement. Until August, the policy had been to reject a voter registration application that did not match the information in the Social Security Administration or motor vehicles’ database. After realizing how often administrative or other errors could result in a voter’s rejection from the list, the Department of State issued an alert stating: Rejecting voter registration applications solely on these bases is not required by HAVA and is not authorized by Pennsylvania law. Because its policies and procedures appear to be resulting in the rejection of applications for reasons unrelated to the qualification of applicants to be registered voters, the Department has concluded that its procedures actually are frustrating the principal purpose and intent of HAVA to ensure that eligible persons are not disenfranchised…Under HAVA and Pennsylvania law, the failure to achieve a match between a voter registration application and a record in the Commonwealth’s driver’s license database or the database of the Social Security Administration is not a reason to reject the application… [R]ejection of an application for voter registration now can be accomplished only to the affirmative action of the voter registration commission or its authorized staff…38 Other states provided for more open matching rules in the first instance. In Minnesota, for example, even if the information provided on the registration application does not match the databases exactly, the registration can be verified if the county auditor can still “reasonably conclude” that the information in the databases of the Department of Public Safety or the Social Security Administration and the information on the registration application “relate to the same person”.39 In this case, the county auditor is required to note in the database why he or she has come to this conclusion. The Secretary of State’s office must then verify the new information in the statewide voter registration database (collected from new voter registration applications) against the existing voter registration information in the databases of the Department of Public Safety and the Social Security Administration. The Secretary of State’s office is required to produce reports on attempted verifications that list the applications that match the DPS and SSA databases, applications that cannot be verified with certainty against these databases, and registrations whose identifying numbers do not match the DPS and SSA databases. The reports created by the Secretary of State must include a list of possible matches for incomplete registration applications.40 18 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   Florida also faced criticism during the 2004 election when problems surfaced with the state’s process of determining the legitimacy of signatures on registration forms. Hundreds of absentee ballots were rejected because their signatures did not match the digital signatures the Department of Motor Vehicles had on file. Over three-quarters of these ballots belonged to voters between the ages of 18 and 24, many of whom had changed their signature since they had first registered to vote or obtained their driver’s license.41 Since then, the Florida legislature has eliminated the signature line from the voter registration form, but not because of faulty matching processes. As a safeguard against identity theft, the legislature passed a bill preventing signatures and Social Security numbers from being included in the state registration database. In order to register to vote in Florida, applicants must now provide an identification number from one of 10 state-approved forms of identification.42 Notification Many states have no system for promptly notifying a voter if his or her registration application is missing information necessary for him or her to be registered to vote, so by the time Election Day arrives, it is too late for the voter to amend or complete an application and he or she is thus disenfranchised. This problem occurred extensively in 2004, and has occurred continually since then. Some states still have minimal notification and amendment systems. Michigan sends the voter a voter ID card within three weeks of registration and encourages the voter to contact the locality election board if he or she does not receive one. In Arizona, Ohio, Missouri, and Florida, the county election authority is required to send a card in the mail notifying the applicant of missing information. Minnesota requires county election officials to notify voters about missing information via mail, email, or telephone and to provide them with information about the various methods by which they can complete their application. If the registration form is missing the registrant’s Minnesota driver’s license, Minnesota state identification card number, or Social Security number, or confirmation that the applicant has not been issued any of these, the auditor is required to attempt to obtain this information by checking the available information against the DPS and SSA databases.43 Because election day registration is permitted in Minnesota, there is no publicized time frame by which these notifications must be made. 19 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   Third-party registration drives The 2004 Report to the Nation noted the importance of nonpartisan Get-Out-The- Vote efforts in boosting voter registration and turnout in the 2004 election. Such efforts not only assisted voters in navigating the states’ complex registration requirements but provided an important outside check on the states’ systems for processing registration forms by employing “defensive voter registration practices” in which the groups kept track of the names and information of the voters they registered in order to make sure their names appeared on the voter rolls.44 In Florida in 2004, there were allegations of abuse of the process by third party organizations. As a result of these largely unproven charges, the state legislature enacted a law that imposes fines of $250 on third-party groups for each registration form submitted more than ten days after it is received by the group, $500 for each form submitted past the registration deadline, and $5,000 for each form that is not submitted. The law was part of a larger election reform package that was approved by Governor Jeb Bush in June 2005.45 In May 2006, several nonpartisan groups, including the League of Women Voters of Florida, People Acting for Community Together, the Florida AFL-CIO, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Council 79, and SEIU Florida Healthcare Union filed a lawsuit in federal court against the Florida Secretary of State and the head of the elections division, arguing that the law places unconstitutional restrictions on the groups’ voter registration efforts. Many of the groups who engage in third-party registration would be unable to withstand the financial burden of the fines that could result from a few small mistakes; they argue that the law has the potential to suppress their registration efforts that, in 2004, were responsible for half of all new registrations.46 In August 2006, a federal judge agreed, and issued a preliminary injunction enjoining implementation of the law.47 A storm of controversy erupted over the interpretation of Ohio’s recently-passed House Bill 3, which, like Florida’s new law, has the potential to suppress the activities of voter registration groups by imposing harsh penalties for improperly following state procedure for submitting registration forms. The law requires persons being compensated by third-party voter registration groups to collect registration applications to sign their name and to note the name of the organization with whom they are affiliated on each form they submit.48 They must then submit the forms person- 20 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   ally to the appropriate election authority.49 Failure to do so is a felony under the new law. Representatives of third-party registration groups criticized the harshness of the new measures, using the ambiguity of the new rules to point out that “compensation” could include reimbursement for travel and parking expenses, food, or t-shirts. The law was also unclear about the way forms should be submitted, making it seem that they are to be delivered personally to the appropriate election authority. Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell responded to the criticism of his rules by clarifying that the forms could be submitted via mail, although he did not change his interpretation fundamentally. In response to calls for clarification, Secretary of State Blackwell specified that the forms could be submitted via mail. The legislature’s Joint Committee on Agency Rule Review reviewed Blackwell’s interpretation of the rules; despite the objections of the Democratic members of the committee, the Secretary of State’s interpretations were affirmed 6-4 in a party line vote.51 Voting rights groups sued the state challenging the rules. In early September, a federal judge ruled that they were unconstitutional and blocked their enforcement.52 NVRA Implementation The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 required states to make voter registration materials more accessible to the public. The law is commonly known as “Motor-Voter” because of its best known provision which requires states to allow voters to register to vote when they apply for their driver’s license. The NVRA also contains a number of provisions requiring states to make voter registration materials available at public assistance agencies, but these have been less widely implemented than the motor-voter program.53 These public assistance programs were intended to offset the motor-voter provision’s tendency to serve demographic groups who are more likely to have automobiles and interact with the motor vehicle agency. According to a 2004 report released jointly by Demos, Project Vote, and ACORN as part of their NVRA Implementation Project, many states are registering less than one percent of the people who apply for public assistance.54 In response to the report, Members of Congress called on the Department of Justice to prosecute states that were not enforcing the public assistance provisions of the law.55 Among the offending states is Ohio, that perennial site of election administration 21 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   troubles. Though the state indicated in a survey56 conducted by the Election Assistance Commission that it was in compliance with the public assistance provisions of the NVRA, according to a February 2006 study of the state’s six largest counties by an Ohio State University law student, only one public assistance office made voter registration forms available. A Secretary of State study showed that out of a total of 8 million voters registered in Ohio, only 38,821 registered to vote via public assistance agencies. In May 2006, the National Voting Rights Institute, the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Project Vote, and Dechert LLP sent a letter to Ohio Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell notifying him of their intent to sue the state for its failure to implement the public assistance provisions of the NVRA.57 Blackwell has come under attack for using his position as head election official to make decisions that could benefit his gubernatorial campaign. His spokesman, Carlo LoParo, and the state director of elections, Judy Grady, have responded to the letter by saying that the Secretary of State does not have sole responsibility to enforce the law. Other agencies in the state are making moves to improve their implementation of the NVRA, but the NVRA Implementation Project intends to move forward with their suit.58 Missouri has also neglected its obligations under the NVRA. In October 2005, US Representative William Lacy Clay (D-MO) requested an inquiry into whether Missouri state agencies have been implementing the National Voter Registration Act (better known as “Motor-Voter”).59 According to a national study, although voter registration in Missouri rose 31.9% between 1995 and 2004, registrations under the Motor Voter law dropped 87.7%.60 Arizona was cited as an exemplary state in a Demos report on the enforcement of the NVRA. Beginning in the summer of 2004, the Arizona Department of Economic Security (DES) implemented new voter registration procedures which included an emphasis by DES staff on voter registration when interacting with clients, providing voter registration materials in prominent locations in agency offices, creating a voter registration coordinator position in each agency office, submitting registration forms to county recorders daily, and tracking voter registration information about clients.61 In addition to the lesserenforced public assistance provisions, Arizona, like most states, is in compliance with the NVRA’s “motor-voter” provisions. Although Pennsylvania initially failed to enact state legislation to implement the NVRA when it first passed in 1993, the 22 Among the most significant changes since 2004 are the new rules governing what kind of identification voters must bring with them when they appear at the polls to vote. Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   state was eventually brought into compliance by the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.62 The NVRA Implementation Project recently featured the state’s efforts to improve NVRA implementation as exemplary, highlighting in particular the state’s focus on providing specific training to caseworkers in public assistance agencies in Allegheny, Delaware, and Philadelphia Counties.63 VOTER IDENTIFICATION Among the most significant changes since 2004 are the new rules governing what kind of identification voters must bring with them when they appear at the polls to vote. This issue was controversial in 2004 because of its impact on then new provisional ballots; it also touches on the contentious topic of immigration, particularly in states like Arizona and Georgia, which have large immigrant populations. Many states have passed new, more stringent voter identification requirements, purportedly as a way of preventing voter fraud, by ensuring that only citizens who are eligible to vote are able to participate. However, not only is there little proof that voter fraud is a significant problem – particularly voter impersonation at the polls, the only kind of fraud an identification requirement would address – but these identification requirements have the effect of disenfranchising many voters who, for a variety of reasons, are unable to produce the proper identification, even though they are eligible to vote. Even among voters who have the necessary identification, such requirements increase the likelihood of racial and ethnic discrimination. In 2004, Arizona voters approved Proposition 200, which was aimed at restricting illegal immigrants’ access to public benefits. Under Proposition 200, voters must now present proof of citizenship when they register to vote, and they must show some form of government-issued photo identification or two approved non-photo identifications when they appear at the polls to vote. Additionally, per Proposition 200, voters must provide a driver’s license that was issued after October 1, 1996 or some other proof of citizenship along with their voter registration application. If a voter submits a driver’s license issued before October 1, 1996, their voter registration form will be rejected. Since this regulation was enacted, large numbers of voter registration forms (in some counties, up to 72 percent) have been rejected. (See voter registration section above for additional discussion.)64 A number of organizations have sued the state, claiming the voting provisions of Proposition 23 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   200 are unconstitutional and violate the Voting Rights Act and the National Voter Registration Act.65 Georgia was among the first states to pass more stringent voter identification requirements. The topic sparked heated debate in the state’s legislature, as well as among election reformers. In March 2005, the state legislature, after contentious debate, passed legislation (HB 244) requiring voters to present photo ID – driver’s license, state ID, passport, military ID or tribal ID – in order to vote a traditional ballot. If the voter does not have photo ID, the law allows him or her to vote a provisional ballot and then provide documentation in the form of photo ID to the elections office within 48 hours. However, under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), changes to voting laws must be approved by the U.S. Department of Justice. The Justice Department staff initially recommended objecting to the legislation, but this decision was overruled by political appointees and the new identification rules were approved. The new law was challenged in court and a preliminary injunction was granted. In response, the Georgia legislature, working closely with Governor Sonny Perdue, passed a similar law (SB 84) in January 2006 that includes provisions to simplify access to photo ID for elderly, poor, and minority voters. In June 2006, a preliminary injunction was again granted against the newer version of the law by a federal court. In September 2006, a state court declared the law unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement.66 While the state announced its intent to appeal the ruling, the law will not be in effect for the November 2006 election.67 Meanwhile, the state’s implementation of policies intended to simplify access to photo ID has come under attack, since these efforts have been somewhat meager – a single “mobile ID issuing unit” in the form of a school bus that travels throughout the state, according to Jennifer Owens, Executive Director of Georgia’s League of Women Voters. The bus is not accessible to individuals with disabilities, which negates its usefulness for a significant number of voters lacking ID. According to a study conducted by the Secretary of State in which the statewide voter registration database was compared to records of the Department of Driver Services, almost 305,000 voters have not been issued any form of driver’s license or identification card that would satisfy the new ID requirement.68 The study states that a disproportionate number of these 305,000 are minority or elderly voters.69 The Elections Board also indicated that the state would rely heavily on non- 24 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   profit organizations such as the League of Women Voters to conduct education and registration campaigns, a strategy that is undermined considerably by Georgia’s and other states’ new laws imposing harsh penalties on third-party groups such as the LWV for improper submission of registration forms.70 Georgia Secretary of State Cathy Cox has testified that there have been no cases of polling place voter fraud in Georgia in her seven years in office. She stated in her testimony that the new laws create confusion among poll workers and voters about what ID is necessary to vote, making the state more rather than less vulnerable to fraud.71 In spring 2005, Missouri’s state legislature also passed a law requiring photo identification at the polls.72 The bill was signed into law and strongly endorsed by Governor (and former Secretary of State) Matt Blunt, a Republican. The state has come under attack from the Brennan Center, which published a brief on this bill titled “Analysis of Eligible Voters Potentially Barred from the Polls by Restrictive New Identification Requirements in Missouri Senate Bills Nos. 1014 & 730” in which the new ID requirements are described as unconstitutional and exclusionary to “hundreds of thousands of eligible Missouri voters”.73 An estimated 170,000 Missourians lack driver’s licenses. The state has announced plans to issue free non-driver identification cards to help this group comply with the new identification requirements. In order to receive a non-driver identification card, a voter must show lawful presence in the United States - in other words a birth certificate or passport, documents which cost money to obtain. Critics of the new ID requirements also argue that getting a non-driver ID is not as simple as state officials make it out to be. The wait time for getting a birth certificate if the name on the record is misspelled or needs to be corrected for some other reason can be as long as six months. The new law also calls on the Secretary of State to publicize the ID requirement changes via public service announcements and civic education. The state has not earmarked any funds for either the public education campaign or for the non-driver ID program.74 However, Secretary of State Carnahan has announced plans for a public education program to alert voters of the new ID requirements and is working with the Department of Revenues which is responsible for distributing IDs, to target voters who are less likely to have identification that meets the requirements. 75 Both the state Democratic Party and a group of voters have sued the state 25 In order to receive a non-driver identification card, a voter must show lawful presence in the United States - in other words a birth certificate or passport, documents which cost money to obtain. Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   in separate lawsuits regarding the new ID law, claiming that it violates the state constitution. It was declared unconstitutional in September 2006.76 Another lawsuit has been filed in federal court.77 Minnesota requires only the identification mandated by HAVA for most voters. However, voters who want to register after the official registration deadline or on Election Day may do so, providing they present some identification. The list of acceptable forms of identification is fairly expansive: • A Minnesota driver’s license, learner’s permit, identification card, or receipt for one bearing the voter’s current address; • If any of the above bears a former address, a recent utility bill must be presented along with the license; • “Notice of late registration” postcard; • U.S. passport with utility bill; • U.S. military photo ID card with utility bill (utility bill must have name, current address, and be due within 30 days of the election; it may be for electric, gas, water, solid waste, sewer, telephone, or cable TV); • Prior registration listed on roster at former address in precinct; • Oath of registered voter in precinct; • Current students attending postsecondary institutions in Minnesota can present student ID, registration or fee statement with current address; student photo ID with utility bill; student ID if you are on a student housing list on file at the polling place; a voter registered in the precinct to vouch for the registrant’s place of residence.78 Following a 2004 lawsuit in which the ACLU filed suit against the state for discrimination, a federal judge ordered the Secretary of State to allow Native Americans to use their tribal identifications to identify themselves at the polls.79 Even Minnesota, with its broad identification requirements, is considering legislation to make the ID rules stricter, in a political struggle that parallels partisan fighting in many other state legislatures. In 2005, members of the Republican-controlled Minnesota House and the Democratic- Farmer-Labor controlled Senate submitted dueling voter identification bills. The Republican legislation, supported by Representatives Tom Emmer (Delano) and Joe Hoppe (Chaska), would require voters to present photo identification when they appear at the polls to vote.80 This bill passed through the House Civil Law Committee on a party line vote of 6 Republicans in favor and 5 DFLers opposed, and through the House on a party line vote of 71-62.81 There is currently no 26 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   companion bill in the DFL-dominated Senate. 82 Meanwhile, the State Senate passed a bill that would increase the number of options voters have for identifying themselves at the polls; if it passes the House, the law would allow students to present a college or high school ID and a cell phone or other utility bill as proof of residence.83 Ohio, home of many of the most publicized election problems in 2004, passed House Bill 3 in early 2006, requiring all Ohio voters to show identification before casting a ballot effective June 1, 2006. The bill narrowly passed the legislative conference committee on a strict party line vote, with the four Republicans voting in favor, and two Democrats opposed. 84 Democrats and activists say the bill’s identification requirement was not needed, especially since voter fraud has never been a major problem in Ohio. Prior to the bill’s passage, Ohio voters simply needed to sign their names and the signatures would be compared to the signature on file from the voter registration form.85 Now all voters must present one of the approved forms of ID – a current and valid photo ID, a military ID that shows the voter’s name and current address, or a copy of a utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or other government document other than a voting reminder or voter registration notification – that shows the voter’s name and current address. Voters who do not provide one of these documents will still be able to vote by providing the last four digits of their Social Security number and by casting a provisional ballot. Voters who arrive at the polls without one of the above forms of identification will be required to cast a provisional ballot, provided they sign an affirmation of their identity and bring an approved form of identification to the local election board within 10 days of the election.86 The provisional ballot is only counted if elections officials determine that the voter is eligible to vote in the precinct in which the provisional ballot was cast.87 Under House Bill 3, voters requesting absentee ballots must provide “a copy of the elector’s current and valid photo identification, a copy of a military identification that shows the elector’s name and current address, or a copy of a current utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or other government document, other than a notice of an election mailed by a board of elections under section 3501.19 of the Revised Code or a notice of voter registration mailed by a board of elections under section 3503.19 of the Revised Code, that shows the name and address of the elector.”88 HB 3 also 27 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   requires the counties to publicize the ID change. Geauga County estimated that it would spend more than $16,000 to send notifications to each voter informing them of the new requirements.89 Until this year, a voter who appeared at the polls in Florida without identification could sign an affidavit to prove identity. As of January 1, 2006, a voter who appears at the polls to vote in Florida must present one of the approved forms of identification, otherwise he or she must cast a provisional ballot, which may or may not be counted.90 However, unlike some states, the voter is not required to return with identification within a prescribed time period for the provisional ballot to potentially be counted. Under HB 1589/SB 2176, approved by Governor Jeb Bush in June 2005, approved forms of picture identification include a Florida driver’s license, Florida identification card issued by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, United States passport, employee badge or identification, buyer’s club identification, debit or credit card, military identification, student identification, retirement center identification, neighborhood association identification, entertainment identification, and public assistance identification. If the picture identification does not bear a signature, the voter will be asked to provide an additional piece of identification with his or her signature.91 According to electionline.org, Michigan is one of 25 states currently enforcing minimum HAVA ID requirements.92 In recent years, the Michigan state legislature has made several attempts to enforce a more stringent voter identification requirement law passed in the mid-1990s. In 1996, the state passed Public Act 583, which required all voters to provide photo identification before being allowed to vote.93 Though both houses and the governor approved the law in 1996, it was found to be unconstitutional by the state Attorney General for violating the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and was not implemented.94 In the mid-1990s, the issue of voter identification was far less controversial than it is today; the debate over implementation of the bill was resurrected in 2005 when Senate Bill 513 passed into law as PA 71, calling for the enforcement of 1996 PA 583 in the interests of “enhanc[ing] the integrity of elections”, and again in 2006 when state representative Chris Ward submitted House Resolution 199 which called for the state Supreme Court to issue an opinion on the question of whether 1996 PA 583 and 2005 PA 71 violate the state and federal constitutions. 28 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   Supporters argue that an ID requirement is the best check against voter fraud. Opponents equate the law to a poll tax, claiming that it will suppress voter turnout in minority and poor communities. Republican House Majority Floor Leader Ward also introduced legislation that would eliminate the $10 fee for state identification cards. It is unclear whether the bill will pass.95 In April 2006, the Michigan Supreme Court agreed to provide an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of the law. Attorney General Mike Cox was required to submit his arguments against the bill by mid-July.96 Two coalitions of organizations filed amici curiae briefs in support of the position that the law violates the state and national constitutions. Co-signers of one of the briefs, which was submitted in April 2006, include the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People – Detroit Branch, the Michigan State Conference National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the National Bar Association, the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, the League of Women Voters Detroit, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Project Vote, the Association of Communities for Reform Now, Latin Americans for Social and Economic Development, Inc., the City of Detroit, the Detroit Urban League, and the National Conference for Community and Justice- Michigan.97 The other brief was submitted by the AARP and the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights. In summer 2005, the Pennsylvania House of Representatives passed HB 1318, which was intended to expand the amount of time between when military personnel and voters in the foreign service receive their absentee ballots and the absentee ballot deadline. A group of conservative legislators succeeded in attaching two amendments to the bill, one requiring voters to present government-issued photo identification in order to cast a ballot, and the other disenfranchising former felons who are on probation and parole. These controversial amendments provoked a backlash among the activist community, and 56 public interest and community groups joined together as the Protect Our Vote Coalition to fight the bill in what became a lengthy partisan struggle in the state house. The Senate passed a modified version of the bill, stripped of these two amendments. The House reinserted an amendment requiring identification, though not necessarily photo identification, at the polls, before sending the bill to Governor Edward Rendell. Before the bill had even reached his desk, Rendell announced his intent to veto it, saying that the bill would place an “additional burden” on voters. Since 29 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   the bill was vetoed, in February 2006, there appear to be no plans to introduce another photo identification bill.98 Clarifications of Washington’s voter identification requirements were passed in 2005 in SB 5499. The law requires anyone voting in person to provide identification. Approved forms of identification include valid photo identification, such as a driver’s license or a state identification card, a student identification card, a tribal identification card, a voter identification card issued by a county elections officer, or a copy of a current utility bill, bank statement, paycheck, or government check or other government document.99 If a voter appears at the polls without the proper identification, he or she must cast a provisional ballot.100 The law authorizes the secretary of state to adopt rules to implement this identification requirement. Of Washington’s 39 counties, 34 conduct their elections entirely by mail; in the remaining 5 counties, over 61% of voters cast mail-in ballots. The counties that conduct all mail-in elections automatically send an absentee ballot to every eligible registered voter, and no additional identification is required.101 Immediately after the general election of 2004, Wisconsin Republicans focused their efforts on enacting a voter identification law. Republicans charged that problems in the 2004 election, particularly in Milwaukee, underscored the need for more stringent requirements to combat voter fraud.102 The bill was introduced in the aftermath of a report published by the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel that indicated that fraudulent voting had been prevalent during the 2004 election. A thorough investigation by the FBI and the U.S. Attorney showed that the discrepancies in the Journal Sentinel’s report were the result of faulty voter recordkeeping rather than fraud.103 Reports by the Legislative Audit Bureau and the Joint Task Force on Election Reform convened in Milwaukee to do in-depth studies of the 2004 Wisconsin election returns similarly found that there was no evidence of systematic widespread fraud. There are very few cases in which an individual intentionally voted illegally, and the vast majority of the discovered instances of fraudulent voting involved felons who were unaware that they were committing a crime. The number of fraudulent votes, intentional or unintentional, is dwarfed by the high incidence of administrative error. In August 2005, Democrats countered their Republican colleagues by introducing a voter identification bill of their own. The bill requires voters that do not have photo ID to bring a bill bearing their ad- 30 In August 2005, Democrats countered their Republican colleagues by introducing a voter identification bill of their own. Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   dress and to sign an affidavit. Republicans criticized the bill as too lenient; some Democrats complained that it was still too likely to disenfranchise voters and did not address the more likely forms of fraud.104 Since then, the state legislature has twice passed legislation mandating photo ID, and Governor Jim Doyle has twice vetoed such legislation. The legislature could not muster the two-thirds necessary to override the governor’s veto for bills passed in 2003 (AB 111) and 2005 (AB 63 and SB 42) requiring photo ID for all voters. In 2006, the state legislature passed a proposed constitutional amendment to require photo identification for registration on Election Day. However, as noted by the National Conference of State Legislatures, “a proposed constitutional amendment requires adoption by successive legislatures, and ratification by the people, before it can become effective.”105 The legislation remains in deadlock. PROVISIONAL BALLOTS The 2004 Report to the Nation emphasized the tension in dealing with provisional ballots between the necessity of making voting more accessible and easier for voters and the considerable administrative inconvenience and expense of provisional ballots for election officials. This tension is still being resolved in many states. The problems associated with provisional ballots also typify the generally fragmented state of election law in this country, in which interpretation is left up to localities, resulting in a confusing patchwork of various election procedures. These different rules are bound to confuse voters who are easily dissuaded from voting by the inconvenience of dealing with a convoluted election bureaucracy. And it is also a potential unconstitutional violation of equal protection for a voter’s ballot to be counted or not counted based on the stringency or leniency of the ballot counting procedures and identification requirements in the county in which the voter lives. This problem as it pertains specifically to provisional ballots is the result of HAVA’s vagueness in describing how the ballots are to be administered. The Act set up a requirement that all states provide provisional ballots, but left the states considerable leeway in determining the rules for counting the ballots. As evidence of the challenges inherent in such an approach, in 2004 this produced a wide range of rules that varied from county to county within the same state, in some instances in violation of the law. A major source of 31 confusion, for example, was whether a voter could cast a provisional ballot if he or she appeared at the incorrect voting precinct. In Arizona, state rules required that only provisional ballots cast in the proper voting precinct be counted; even so, several counties counted provisional ballots cast in an incorrect precinct.106 Ohio was also the site of major variation in the enforcement of provisional ballot requirements from county to county. Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell came under fire from local election officials for failing to clarify the state’s position on the guidelines regarding provisional ballots as set forth in HAVA. These criticisms came to light during hearings hosted by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission in 2005 on provisional ballots in Ohio.107 According to federal rules, states are required to have federally approved and implemented policies governing the issuing and counting of provisional ballots in place by the first federal elections in 2006.108 In response, in 2005 the state legislature amended the state election laws to standardize conditions under which provisional ballots would be issued and offered across the state.109 Under the new law, provisional ballots must be cast in the proper precinct; otherwise they will not be counted. This measure, the law’s sponsors said, was aimed at eliminating the long lines at polling places that prevent many people from voting.110 Opponents of this provision, however, argue that it will disenfranchise voters who inadvertently show up at the wrong polling place, especially if there is not enough time to travel to the proper location and vote before polling places close. Moreover, voters often vote at the wrong precinct because of misinformation from poll workers, and because in practical terms several precincts can actually be comprised of several desks within the same room. As a result, voting in the wrong precinct might just be a matter of voting at the wrong table in the right school or church. ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

In Pennsylvania, as in many other states in 2004, many problems arose from the logistics of administering provisional ballots. There were reports from all over the state about poll workers who were poorly trained in distributing provisional ballots, as well as reports of insufficient ballots for distribution in the first place.111 In response to these problems, Governor Rendell convened a bipartisan panel to discuss problems in the November 2004 election and to make recommendations for improving election administration.112 Many Pennsylvania counties that were most significantly affected by these problems in 2004 announced efforts to remediate them in subsequent primary and 32 statewide elections. Allegheny County, where 104 of the county’s 1309 polling places ran out of provisional ballots, announced in spring 2005 that they would provide at least 50 provisional ballots to each polling station, and more to sites which experienced large increases in voter registration.113 In Ohio, similar logistical problems prevented many people from casting provisional ballots in 2004. Such problems arose from a general lack of awareness on the part of voters that provisional ballots were available, and under what conditions they were available. Some voters ended up not casting provisional ballots simply because they were standing in the wrong line at the right polling place.114 Problems with verification The 2004 Report to the Nation noted that the most prevalent problems related to provisional ballots resulted from human error, a trend that continues. In Florida, there have been numerous instances since 2004 in which improper counting of provisional ballots cast doubt over the outcome of an election.115 Washington State’s problems in 2004 exemplify human error problems. Analysis of the election results found that not only had verification of provisional ballots been questionable, but that in one instance provisional ballots were fed into vote counting machines without proper verification of voter registration.116 In Washington, provisional and absentee ballots are verified in part by comparison of the signature on each ballot to a signature on file for each voter. A report showed wide variation between counties in the number of ballots rejected because of a failure to match a signature. In some counties where more than half of the provisional ballots were rejected because of their signatures, comparisons are made according to a rigorous rubric of identifying traits, while in other counties, in which fewer than one percent of the provisional ballots were rejected because of signatures, officials make rough visual comparisons. 117 In a state in which some 70% of voters cast absentee ballots rather than showing up at the polls, differences in signature verification policies between counties can have a big impact.118 In 2005, almost all of Washington’s counties voted to move to an all-mail system in which there are no polling places, eliminating the need for provisional ballots.119 To address these and other problems, the state legislature passed a comprehensive bill in June 2005 calling for a number of 33 In Washington, provisional and absentee ballots are verified in part by comparison of the signature on each ballot to a signature on file for each voter. Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   election reforms. The law clarifies the process by which signatures are verified on provisional ballots, requiring the county auditor to notify the voter by the day before certification of the election results if he or she has failed to sign the provisional ballot envelope or if the signature on the envelope does not match the one on the voter registration. The law specifies that the auditor must contact the voter by telephone and then by mail, giving the voter the opportunity to remedy the missing or mismatched signature either in person or by mail, The law requires provisional ballots to be visually distinguishable from other ballots and either printed on colored paper or imprinted with a bar code. This is designed to prevent provisional ballots from being read by vote counting machines at the polling site, thus precluding tabulation before the provisional votes have been verified. The law specifies what information must be recorded on the provisional ballot envelope, requires the county auditor to provide a free access system so provisional voters can learn whether their ballots were counted, and requires that voters without identification be given a provisional ballot. The bill was signed into law by Governor Christine Gregoire on May 3, 2005 and took effect on January 1, 2006.120 Another solution to these provisional ballot problems is Election Day registration, a policy adopted by both Wisconsin and Minnesota. Election Day registration virtually eliminates the need for provisional ballots. In Wisconsin, only 374 provisional ballots were cast in 2004.121 The only time provisional ballots are used in Wisconsin is when the voter does not have HAVArequired identification.122 Minnesota does not use provisional ballots.123 ID problems One of the most common reasons for issuing provisional ballots is for use by voters who have failed to bring proper identification with them to the polling place. Many states have altered their voter identification requirements since 2004 and expect to see a rise in the number of provisional ballots requested in upcoming elections. Many have passed laws calling for temporary or permanent adjustments to the circumstances under which they issue provisional ballots, to accommodate these new ID rules. The issue of provisional ballots became especially heated in Arizona last year when the Department of Justice advised that in implementing Proposition 200 the state could deny provisional ballots to voters without identification. After much criticism, the Department issued a “clari- 34 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   fication” letter stating that, in fact, voters without ID are entitled to a provisional ballot.124 It was silent, however, about the circumstances under which such ballots would be counted. State procedures now say that the voter must return with identification within five days in order for the ballot to be counted.125 Georgia has received a lot of criticism for its new voter ID law which allows voters to cast provisional ballots if they forget to bring their ID when they come to vote. The law requires voters to produce their photo ID at the county elections office within 48 hours of casting their provisional ballot in order for their vote to be counted.126 Missouri also altered its provisional ballot requirements to accommodate the state’s new, more stringent photo ID law. The law, passed in spring 2006, allows anyone who does not have an appropriate photo identification to cast a provisional ballot in the November 2006 election. They can present an out-of-state driver’s license, a college ID, or a utility bill, as long as their signature matches the signature election authorities have on file. By November 2008, voters will no longer have the option of presenting alternatives to photo identification; if they arrive at a polling place to vote without one, they will be given a provisional ballot which will not be counted unless they return the same day with the proper identification.127 In Ohio, officials are preparing for greater demand for provisional ballots than experienced in 2004 as a result of the state’s new, more stringent ID requirements. An Ohio voter who shows up at the correct voting precinct without the proper photo ID will be allowed to cast a provisional ballot if he or she can provide a verifiable SSN-4 or signs a sworn statement affirming his or her identity.128 A voter who is unable to provide the necessary identification or who has a Social Security number but cannot provide the last four digits of that number must return with proper identification within 10 days of the election in order for the provisional ballot to be counted. Challenges to voter registration, another hot topic in 2004, drew legislative responses in some states. In Florida, where registration challenges were prevalent in 2004, a bill passed by the state legislature amended the laws pertaining to provisional ballots, allowing voters whose registrations are challenged to cast a provisional ballot.129 35 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   SUPPRESSION AND INTIMIDATION Hilary Shelton, Washington Bureau Director of the NAACP, remarked in 2004, that “no one knows the real number of Americans who could not vote because” of frustrations in dealing with the process that led them to just give up and leave the polling place, perhaps never to return.130 As Shelton pointed out, the processes of registering to vote and then of casting a ballot are complicated enough to dissuade Americans from voting. Reports from 2004 uncovered significant efforts to prevent people from voting using illegal intimidation and misinformation. Some of the most disturbing incidents involved distribution in minority areas of fliers containing misleading information about voting procedures. In one notorious incident, a flier attributed to the “Milwaukee Black Voters League” was distributed in African American neighborhoods. It read, in part: SOME WARNINGS FOR ELECTION TIME IF YOU’VE ALREADY VOTED IN ANY ELECTION THIS YEAR YOU CAN’T VOTE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. IF YOU [OR ANYBODY IN YOUR FAMILY] HAVE EVER BEEN FOUND GUILTY OF ANYTHING, EVEN A TRAFFIC VIOLATION, YOU CAN’T VOTE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. … IF YOU VIOLATE ANY OF THESE LAWS YOU CAN GET TEN YEARS IN PRISON AND YOUR CHILDREN WILL BE TAKEN AWAY FROM YOU. U.S. Senator Barack Obama has introduced the Deceptive Elections Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act of 2005 that makes such acts a crime and gives law enforcement authority to look into allegations of deceptive practices, establishing harsh penalties for those who have engaged in such fraudulent practices, along with a process for getting accurate information to voters who have been the targets of such misinformation campaigns. The law has not been passed, and unfortunately, with few exceptions, states have done little since the 2004 election to prevent future acts of deception, suppression, and intimidation. Arizona has taken a small step to address the problem. Under Arizona law, “in an attempt to influence the outcome of an election, an individual or committee shall not . . . deliver or mail any document that falsely purports to be a mailing authorized, approved, required, sent or reviewed by or that falsely simulates a document from the government of this state, a county, city or town or any other political subdivision.”131 By Arizona statute, it is also illegal to intimidate employees 36 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   into voting132, or “directly or indirectly, to make use of force, violence or restraint, or to inflict or threaten infliction, by himself or through any other person, of any injury, damage, harm or loss, or in any manner to practice intimidation upon or against any person, in order to induce or compel such person to vote or refrain from voting for a particular person or measure at any election provided by law.”133 Minnesota passed a law in 2006 making it a gross misdemeanor to knowingly deceive another person regarding the time, place, or manner of conducting an election or the qualifications for or restrictions on voter eligibility for an election, with the intent to prevent the individual from voting in the election. The law makes provisions for election officials to notify the public that false information has been circulated and to distribute accurate information in its place.134 Missouri passed the “Missouri Voter Protection Act” (SB 1014) which makes it a felony to “[engage] in any act of violence, destruction of property having a value of five hundred dollars or more, or threatened act of violence with the intent of denying a person’s lawful right to participate in the election process, and [to] knowingly [provide] false information about election procedures for the purpose of preventing someone from going to the polls.”135 This bill, which also included provisions requiring voters to provide photo identification to vote at the polls, passed through both houses of the state legislature after acrimonious debate, and was signed into law by Governor Matt Blunt in July 2006.136 In November 2005, the Pennsylvania House of Representatives passed House Bill 544, which deals with voter harassment issues, among them deceptive practices.137 Some of the most egregious charges of voter suppression in the 2004 election occurred in Pennsylvania where Pennsylvania voters in predominantly African American or Democratic districts were sent fliers on “official” county letterhead saying that Republicans were to vote on Tuesday, November 2 and Democrats were to vote on Wednesday, November 3.138 The bill provides that anyone who circulates deliberately misleading information regarding the date or location of a polling place in a mailing shall pay a fine of up to $15,000 or be imprisoned for up to 7 years. The bill is currently stuck in the state senate. In Ohio, State Senator Ray Miller introduced a deceptive practices bill that would criminalize any acts intending to mislead 37 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   disenfranchised, poor, or minority voters about voting information, including election days and polling place hours. There has been a sponsor hearing on the bill and a Republican lawmaker is expected to introduce a companion bill in the Ohio House in the near future.139 Challenges Aside from illegal vote suppression tactics such as those described above, the most significant intimidation efforts have surprisingly fallen within the law. In 2004, Republican groups and others made use – and some might argue abused – the legal provisions for challenging a voter’s eligibility. For example, in 2004, three men asked the Board of Registrars in Atkinson County, Georgia for a list of Hispanics registered to vote and then filed challenges against 95 of the 121 registered voters. The local registrar denied the challenges because of concerns that they constituted a violation of the 1964 federal Voting Rights Act.140 Instances such as these got a good deal of publicity in states with hotly contested elections such as Ohio and Florida. In Ohio, in the months before the November election, the Ohio Republican party challenged the eligibility of more than 35,000 registered voters throughout the state. Over 10,000 of these challenges were rejected or withdrawn because of glitches in Republican databases or filing errors. The state Democratic Party filed suit against the Secretary of State in an attempt to block the challenges, which, they said, “violate due process and threaten the right to vote of people across the state.”141 Beyond these registration challenges, there were some reports of voters appearing at the polls on Election Day in Ohio to find their eligibility challenged after the Supreme Court made a last-minute ruling allowing partisan poll watchers to enter polling places on Election Day to make eligibility challenges.142 Voter registration and polling place eligibility challenges were unquestionably one of the biggest problems during the 2004 election. Since 2004, there has been little action on the part of the states to clarify their laws governing the behavior of challengers or to try to constrain abusive practices in this area. And there have been no reports on this problem in elections since 2004, most likely because it is a more useful tactic in high-turnout elections, and will likely arise again next in the 2008 elections. There are a few notable exceptions, however. In Minnesota, the state legislature passed a bill in 2005 restricting challengers at polling places on Election Day. The 38 Voter registration and polling place eligibility challenges were unquestionably one of the biggest problems during the 2004 election. Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   bill requires challengers to sign an oath that they have personal knowledge of the challenged individual’s ineligibility to vote, that the challengers participate in training paid for by their political party, and that they wear badges identifying them as challengers. The law also prevents challengers from out of state from challenging Minnesota voters,143 and limits challengers to one per political party per polling place.144 The Ohio legislature also addressed this issue, incorporating provisions into House Bill 3 that change the parameters for voter challenges. Effective on June 1, 2006 any challenge to a registered elector’s right to vote must be made at least 20 days prior to an election. The challenge “shall be filed with the board on a form proscribed by the secretary of state and shall be signed under penalty of election falsification.” If the board of elections is unable to determine the outcome of a challenge, a hearing must be held within 10 days of the challenge, and a notice must be sent to the registered voter and the challenger via first-class mail at least 3 days before a scheduled hearing. If the challenge is filed within 30 days of an election, the board has the option of postponing a hearing until after the election. Under this circumstance, the voter’s registration can still be challenged at the polls and they may be forced to vote a provisional ballot.145 At the same time, HB 3 includes a provision that would allow poll workers to inquire if a voter is a naturalized citizen and to require those voters who answer in the affirmative to provide their naturalization papers in order to vote. If they cannot provide proof at the polling place, the voter must cast a provisional ballot that will only be counted if he or she goes to the Board of Elections with documentation within 10 days of the election. Voting rights groups have challenged the rules in federal court.146 Washington has recently enacted a law addressing election challengers. Election bill SSB 6362 places restrictions on the conditions under which a challenge can be made. For example, a challenge can be made if the challenger has personal knowledge that the voter has been convicted of a felony without having had his or her rights restored, knows the voter has been judicially declared ineligible to vote due to mental incompetence, is not a citizen of the United States, will not be old enough to vote by Election Day, or does not live at the residential address provided on the registration form. A challenge based on residency requires the challenger to either provide proof of the 39 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   voter’s actual residence or to submit evidence that he or she completed a number of specified steps to verify that the voter does not reside at the address given. The actual residence or proof of due diligence must be provided when the challenge is filed.147 SSB 6362 also establishes a deadline for challenges and the process for determining whether a challenged ballot can be counted. Meanwhile, some states have no laws governing election challenges. In Pennsylvania, there is no deadline for issuing challenges and no penalty for issuing a false challenge.148 Voters may submit complaints via the Department of State website or by filing a complaint through an administrative complaint procedure required under Title III of HAVA.149 As of 2006, Florida law permits any elector or poll watcher to challenge the right of any voter to vote 30 days or less before an election by filing a completed copy of the oath, and provides for a penalty for a voter or poll watcher who files a frivolous challenge. However, an elector or poll watcher is not subject to liability for any action taken in good faith and in furtherance of any activity or duty permitted of such elector or poll watcher by law. Each instance where any elector or poll watcher files a frivolous challenge of any person’s right to vote constitutes a separate offense. (HB 1567) (FS 101.048 and 101.111).150 A challenged voter must vote by a provisional ballot which will only be counted if the voter comes back by 5:00 PM on the third day following the election with written proof that he or she was entitled to vote.151 Most states have laws on their books governing the behavior of challengers, delineating what constitutes a challenge and who can challenge. In Arizona, for example, each political party represented on the ballot is allowed one challenger per election precinct. Challengers can challenge a voter orally if he or she has reason to believe that person is not qualified to vote or has voted previously in the same election.152 However, these laws are often vague and are enforced differently from one election jurisdiction to another. POLL WORKERS AND POLLING PLACES Recruitment Electionline.org chief Doug Chapin used the term “system overload” to describe the problems on Election Day 2004.153 These problems have not occurred during subsequent elections because odd year elections normally see much lower turn- 40 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   out. But these issues bear great relevance for the 2006 and 2008 elections. One of the biggest headline-grabbing problems of the 2004 election was the long wait in line at many polling places. In Ohio, many people waited late into the night to cast their ballot because their polling place was overwhelmed by voter turnout. One of the most important ways to strengthen our elections is to increase the number of poll workers available at polling places to help voters cast their ballots, and to improve poll worker training so they are less likely to make mistakes that could jeopardize the outcomes of elections. Even in low-volume primary elections, however, many problems related to poll worker staffing and training continue to occur. In a 2006 Ohio county council primary, votes for several writein candidates were overlooked in ballot counting because of poll worker error. Turnout was so low in this election that these errors cost some candidates their city council seats.154 Another problem is that Americans are poorly informed about their rights as voters and about the voting process, and are thus fearful at the polls and susceptible to disenfranchisement because they are not comfortable questioning the directions of misinformed poll workers. The 2004 Report to the Nation pointed to a low level of civic education with respect to voting, and recommended that voting problems could be eliminated by educating the public about the process. After the “system overload” of 2004, many states initiated programs to recruit more poll workers and train them in time for the next high turnout elections. Florida has mounted a “Be A Poll Worker” campaign that includes public service announcements and handouts. Some counties are using voter education funds to recruit high school and college students as poll workers. However, the Florida state legislature did not appropriate any federal HAVA funds to conduct a statewide campaign worker recruitment campaign.155 In 2005, Michigan passed a law to allow teenage election inspectors if they are at least 16 years old and supervised by no fewer than 3 adults at their polling location.156 Detroit has implemented a training program to enable high schoolers to participate in the 2006 primary election. The students were required to be at least 16 years old and to participate in a two-hour training session.157 Minnesota has begun recruiting young people to participate in a program to become “trainee election judges” if they are at least 16 years of age. Students can be appointed by their school or school district. No more 41 Georgia has established training modules for election officials that are designed to help them with poll worker recruitment, training, and retention. Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   than one-third of the election judges at a given polling place can be trainee election judges. The Secretary of State’s office has also begun recruiting college students to serve as election judges.158 As part of its new election reform bill, State Act 150, Pennsylvania allows high-school students, with the approval of their Principals, and college students to serve as poll workers. In 2006, Allegheny County is holding 40 training sessions for 5,500 poll workers. The county executive described the 2.5-hour sessions as “intense.” Poll workers will earn an extra $20 for participating in the training sessions.159 Georgia has established training modules for election officials that are designed to help them with poll worker recruitment, training, and retention. In response to a recent state law that allows 16-year olds to work at polling places, several counties have engaged in student recruitment efforts. 160 The state relies heavily on nonprofit organizations (such as the League of Women Voters) to manage civic education programs that encourage people to volunteer.  161 Ohio has made no effort on the state level to recruit more poll workers. According to the Secretary of State, it is the responsibility of the county board of elections to recruit and train poll workers, so there are no statewide standards with respect to poll worker training. Despite Ohio’s highly publicized problem with poll workers in 2004, with long lines and insufficient poll workers preventing some voters from casting their ballots, the state has made no move to change its practices.162 In Washington’s highly publicized gubernatorial election trial, untrained poll workers were behind the most significant problems. During the trial, evidence showed pervasive poll worker error, with volunteers inserting provisional ballots into the counting machine before they had been verified, losing whole boxes of ballots, and allowing felons without reinstated voting rights to vote, among other problems. The election reform passed by the state legislature in the aftermath of the debacle called for major improvements to the state’s poll worker training programs. Separately, the Secretary of State’s office issued a notice to election officials clarifying that, under the federal Voting Rights Act, a voter with limited English proficiency may obtain assistance in casting a ballot from a person of his or her choosing.163 However, because most of Washington’s counties have moved to an all-mail voting system, the demand for poll workers in the state has decreased significantly since 2004. Only four counties in Washington continue to maintain 42 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   poll sites. For the four counties with poll workers, the average training is approximately two hours and covers provisional ballots, ID requirements, poll site information, voting machine information, and other relevant training.164 King County, the state’s largest county and the site of the most highly-publicized election problems in 2004, has targeted local community colleges and universities in an effort to expand its pool of poll workers. In order to attract more students, the Poll Worker Coordinator is publicizing that students will be paid for their service. In addition, the state recently sponsored College Civics Week to highlight the need for civic involvement. The Elections Office used this opportunity to attract attention to its poll worker recruitment effort. At this point, however, there has not been much effort to recruit high school students because the need for poll workers is diminishing, given the increase in mail voting across the state.165 Wisconsin has made it easier to become a poll worker in order to address the problem of overloaded polling places. The issue of insufficient poll workers is particularly acute in Wisconsin, which has Election Day registration and thus a heavier Election Day workload than other states. Wisconsin election officials recruit high school and college students to help operate polling places. Accessibility Even though HAVA requires that voters with disabilities be given a chance to vote privately and independently – a requirement not just limited to voting machines – the perennial problem of polling place accessibility was a major barrier to voting in 2004.166 An October 2004 poll conducted by the National Organization on Disability reported that, “Twenty-one percent of U.S. adults with disabilities—representing more than eight million potential voters— say they have been unable to vote in presidential or congressional elections due to barriers faced either at, or in getting to, the polls.” Yet such experiences were repeated in the November 2004 election, barriers made even worse by the long lines encountered in many polling places. The Election Protection coalition which engaged thousands of volunteers to take calls and monitor polling sites for irregularities, reported on Election Day 2004 that, “Disabled voters have continued to have difficulty gaining access to the polls, and many report having been denied curbside voting alternatives. The hotline recently received such complaints from Wisconsin and North Carolina. Several callers in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Potomac, Maryland, and Cuyahoga County, 43 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   Ohio, complained that accommodations were being denied to sight-impaired voters. A caller from Cleveland reported that when she attempted to assist her sightimpaired neighbor, a poll worker called the police.167 The ten states examined have taken little meaningful legislative action to further ensure poll site accessibility since 2004. In many states, legislation has been introduced, sometimes repeatedly, but has not attained final passage.168 In Florida, 2004 legislation (H 1701/ S2946) that would put forth a bill of rights that required notice of availability of accommodations for person with disabilities and training for poll workers on accommodating voters with disabilities failed. The Ohio legislature failed to pass a bill (HB 129) that requires the Americans with Disabilities Act coordinator and the Secretary of State to inspect all polling places to ensure that they comply with the Act. That state also failed to pass laws requiring accessible parking at polling places (HB 224, HB 312). All three bills were reintroduced and again failed to pass in the 2006 legislative session. Last year, Minnesota introduced but did not pass legislation that would have clarified the right to vote of a person under guardianship, and added to the Voters Bill of Rights a statement that said “If you are unable to enter the polling place, you have the right to request assistance and to vote at the polling place without leaving your vehicle.” The legislation clarified that a person under guardianship does not lose the right to vote unless a court order says so. Pennsylvania has made modest improvements in reducing the number of inaccessible polling places. Out of approximately 9,000 polling places statewide, the number of inaccessible locations stands at 1810, or 431 fewer than were counted in a March 2005 assessment.169 In 2004, Washington did pass a bill (S6419) that created an early voting process for disabled voters in which specific dates, locations, and hours for disabled voting must be designated by the county auditor. Michigan is using $400,000 in HAVA grant money to improve polling place accessibility. The Department of State selected areas of the state to receive portions of the grant after conducting a survey of all Michigan polling places in 2004. The grants will go toward improving the accessibility of parking, passenger drop-off areas, paths of travel, building entrances and voting areas.170 Similarly, 44 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   Arizona has used federal grant money to improve access to voting areas and polling places.171 VOTING MACHINES In the wake of the 2000 presidential election and Florida’s infamous problems with hanging chads, the Help America Vote Act offered funds for the purchase of new voting machines that use technology promising greater accessibility and accuracy. Unfortunately, in the rush to acquire the new machines, not enough support was given to local and state jurisdictions on specifications and guidelines, and purchasers had to rely to a large extent on the advice of vendors to help them decipher the highly technical issues attending the transition to electronic voting machines. Consequently, each election since 2000 has been rife with reports of machine failures. One of the most significant changes under the Help America Vote Act is its requirement that one machine per polling place be accessible to citizens with disabilities. 172 This highlights the importance of ensuring, to the greatest extent possible, that people with disabilities can cast their votes in privacy. While HAVA does not specify the exact technology that must be used to meet this accessibility requirement, and while a number of systems may meet the standard, most jurisdictions have attempted to comply through the purchase of Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) machines. DREs – along with other such voting systems – have been controversial, however, as concerns have been raised by computer experts as to whether they are secure. In part, this is because the nontransparent tabulation method of voting machine software is protected by secret proprietary software, and also because the methods of testing their accuracy are currently inadequate.173 The security and accuracy issues surrounding electronic voting machines have attracted widespread attention. Concerns about DREs and other voting systems must be addressed in a way that ensures that citizens with disabilities can cast their ballots in private as required by HAVA. Often there are too few machines at polling places to accommodate the number of voters who show up. In 2004, as in other high turnout elections, voters who waited into the night in long lines to cast their ballots made the news. However, in the years since 2004, little has been done to ensure that there will be sufficient numbers of machines at the ready to accommodate large numbers of voters when the time comes. 45 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   Voting Machine Distribution Formulas Only some states have language in their election laws setting up formulas for ensuring that sufficient election equipment will be provided at each polling place to accommodate the number of voters who are likely to show up there to cast their ballot. In Arizona, for example, election law assigns responsibility to the state’s counties for designating a “convenient” number of smaller election precincts within their boundaries. Each precinct has one polling place.174 As for equipment at these polling places, the state has established a formula that specifies the number of voting machines that are to be provided based on the number of people the polling site is intended to serve.175 Florida does not have a formula for determining the number of voting machines for each precinct. Each county supervisor of elections determines the number of machines to put in each precinct.176 A law was passed in 2001 by the Georgia legislature requiring the standardization of all of Georgia’s election equipment. Also in 2001, Georgia passed Act 164 (HB 110) mandating that “ballots be supplied in a number equal to active registered voters.” 177 Currently, elections officials recommend one voting machine per 150-190 active voters. However, some counties report as many as 240 active voters per machine during the 2004 election. The state allotted voting machines to their respective counties in July; however, voter registration increased by 10 to 20 percent in some precincts between July and the general election. The state also kept 50 machines to be distributed to the precincts with greatest demand on Election Day and another 27 machines to replace units that malfunction.178 Georgia was one of the many states in 2004 where voters had to wait in long lines in order to cast their ballots,179 although state officials pinpoint the problems to two counties in particular and believe delays were related to voter check-in.180 Since 2004, the state has made no move to change its guidelines or laws governing polling places in order to be fully equipped for large numbers of voters. In recent primary elections, the state has successfully implemented electronic poll books, which allow voters to check in at the polls more efficiently and with less confusion. The poll books were particularly helpful in directing voters who showed up at the wrong precinct to the proper precinct, minimizing the number of provisional ballots the localities needed to process.181 46 Minnesota’s formula for distributing voting machines and ballots is somewhat vague. Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   In Minnesota, it is difficult to predict the number of people who will turn out to vote since registration continues on Election Day, so Minnesota’s formula for distributing voting machines and ballots is somewhat vague. There must be at least one voting machine for use by disabled voters, according to state law. Beyond this, each county (voting jurisdiction) is required to submit a plan outlining its voting machine allocation and budget for purchasing that equipment.182 In Ohio in 2004 there were fewer voting machines available in more heavily minority, Democratic, and urban areas as compared to more heavily Republican, suburban, and exurban areas, leading to charges of partisan manipulation of the machine allocations. At Kenyon College, there were only 2 machines for 1,300 would-be voters, even though a surge in registrations promised a large voting population. At nearby Mt. Vernon Nazarene University, there were many machines and no lines. In Franklin County, election officials decided to make do with 2,886 machines and left at least 125 machines in storage, even though records indicated they would need at least 5,000 machines. In Lucas County, machines kept malfunctioning, eventually leading the county’s election director to admit that prior tests of the machines had failed.183 As part of House Bill 3, the state’s controversial election reform act, the state must ensure that counties using DREs provide at least one machine for every 175 voters registered in the previous Presidential election. However, the provision does not take effect until 2013. 184 Meanwhile, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently remanded the case of Stewart et al v. Blackwell to district court for further fact finding. The case charges that the state’s lack of uniformity in providing up-to-date, functioning voting technology to its various counties constitutes a violation of Equal Protection and the Voting Rights Act.185 Wisconsin mandates at least one voting booth per 200 voters. However, the actual purchase and distribution of voting machines is the responsibility of each municipality. The state simply certifies specific technologies and then reimburses each municipality for its purchases.186 Neither Pennsylvania nor Washington appears to have any formula regarding equipment distribution. Implementation Conflicts State and local election officials are conflicted in their efforts to satisfy the dual 47 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   mandates to provide voting equipment that allows voters to verify their choices and that is accessible to all voters. Most voting machine-related problems occur between state election officials, local administrators, and voting machine vendors over one or a combination of the following issues: • the equipment is non-compliant with HAVA accessibility provisions; • the equipment is non-compliant with voter verification rules on state level; • the equipment is not secure; • the equipment is incompatible with current equipment used by state; or • there are insufficient funds for locality to replace equipment. The prototypical example of this battle is Florida, having experienced all of the above issues. Florida is the Ground Zero of voting machine troubles. So-called maverick elections supervisor Ion Sancho187 of Leon County, Florida, began the fracas in 2005 when he refused to use Diebold machines to come into compliance with HAVA’s requirement that accessible voting machines be in place by January 2006, citing security concerns. (Sancho hosted a test of Diebold’s equipment, in which security experts hacked into the system and manipulated votes.188) Outraged by Sancho’s attack on its credibility, the company withdrew its bid to provide the county with its updated, accessible machines. The other two vendors authorized to provide election equipment to Florida voting jurisdictions also refused Sancho a contract189, causing Leon County to miss the HAVA deadline for implementing accessible equipment and to lose federal grant money for implementation costs.191 In February 2006, Florida Attorney General Charlie Crist investigated civil rights and anti-trust violations among the three voting machine vendors authorized to provide voting equipment to the state’s voting jurisdictions. Secretary of State Sue Cobb was asked by Leon County Commissioner Bill Proctor to reopen talks with Diebold to bring the county into compliance with HAVA requirements.192 The discussions were successful in persuading Diebold to agree to provide Leon County with accessible equipment in time for the September 2006 primary.193 However, the issue of security is far from resolved. In April 2006, the state proposed rules that would restrict voting machine security tests by local officials, much to the fury of Sancho and his fellow security skeptics.194 “People in Leon County would rather vote on paper than on vapor,” Sancho said.195 In response to a 2002 mandate by the Michigan state legislature that the state 48 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   standardize its voting equipment by 2006, Secretary of State Land ordered all counties to adopt an optical scan system.196 By current state law, there must be a single optical scan tabulator in each precinct to scan the ballots cast there. The larger of Michigan’s counties also maintain backup optical scan machines in the event of equipment breakdowns.197 There has been no word of problems with insufficient ballots in the state.198 Michigan has experienced its own scuffle over implementation in the past few months. In 2003, after HAVA was passed, the state came up with a scheme for distributing federal funds for replacing voting machines (not in time for the 2004 election). Counties began upgrading their systems in 2005. As is the case in many other states, major population centers objected to the expense and inconvenience of adopting new, unfamiliar equipment. In Wayne County, every community except Detroit has embraced new equipment produced by Election Systems & Software. These machines have battery packs in case of outages (a problem in 2004199)200 But Jackie Currie, Detroit City Clerk, refused to install the equipment chosen for the county by Wayne County Clerk Cathy Garrett, favoring a similar optical scan system produced by Sequoia Voting Systems that is more familiar to voters and more compatible with the equipment currently in use in the city. (Diebold Election Systems, Election Systems & Software, and Sequoia Voting Systems, the Big Three of voting machine vendors, are the only vendors approved to provide voting machines to Michigan counties.)201 The city ultimately acquiesced to the county’s request that it use the same equipment used elsewhere in the county.202 In Minnesota, there was an ongoing dispute in 2005 between the Secretary of State and three counties – Ramsey, Washington, and Anoka (all three in the Twin Cities area) – over what voting equipment to purchase to best meet the needs of voters with disabilities, specifically over what kind of voter interface the voting equipment offered. The counties ultimately complied with the state’s request that they purchase Automark, produced by Election Systems and Software, rather than their preferred Diebold alternative. The Automark is the only voter assist terminal that produces a paper record of each vote cast. Another contentious issue was the higher cost of the Automark equipment. Funding for the improvements is being covered in part by federal grants. In the interests of preparing for the 2006 elections and coming into compliance with HAVA, the three counties dropped their complaints to the Secretary of State in 49 The Automark is the only voter assist terminal that produces a paper record of each vote cast. Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   March 2006.203 Since Missouri Secretary of State Blunt announced in early 2004 that all new voting machines would need to produce paper records, there have been a number of cases in which counties or local voting jurisdictions have objected to the added expense of updating their equipment and have requested financial support from the state or have resisted implementation.204 Paper Records Rules In 2002, HAVA provided unprecedented federal funding for the replacement of outdated, broken down voting equipment. In addition to requiring at least one accessible machine in each polling place, the new law required that all machines replaced using federal money had to produce a permanent paper record that could be used in recounts. HAVA did not, however, require that this record be verifiable by the voter. Many states opted to replace their old lever machines with Direct Response Electronic devices (DREs). More than half of the states have gone further, passing legislation requiring voting machines to produce voter verified paper audit trails (VVPAT).205 The EAC has issued guidelines for the use of VVPATs, including accessibility standards,206 and there have been additional statements by national voter advocacy organizations either urging other states to move in a similar direction or dropping their previous opposition.207 Such legislation has been passed in Washington, where a VVPAT must be installed on all electronic voting devices. State law requires counties to have plans to purchase and install VVPAT on all electronic voting devices used in Washington in 2006. (Because 34 of the state’s 39 counties run all-mail elections, the expense and inconvenience will not be too great; thus, there has been little conflict over this issue in Washington, as there has been in other states with VVPAT.) Ohio was one of the first states to adopt VVPAT. Unfortunately, Ohio’s HB 3, passed in 2006, dropped the requirement for random routine audits of those records. The bill specifies how the paper printout is to be treated in the event of a recount.208 Paper record battles are being initiated by outside groups like Voter Action, which raised concerns about faulty electronic voting equipment and successfully compelled New Mexico to adopt an all-paper optical scan ballot system. The group filed a lawsuit against the Arizona Secretary of State, arguing that the touch-screen voting technology the state has adopted for its 2,000-plus voting precincts is un- 50 Paper record battles are being initiated by outside groups like Voter Action, which raised concerns about faulty electronic voting equipment and successfully compelled New Mexico to adopt an all-paper optical scan ballot system. Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   reliable and susceptible to tampering.209 As a result, officials from several counties have postponed the purchase of their voting machines, raising the ire of advocates for voters with disabilities whom the new voting machines were intended to benefit.210 Lawyers representing the Secretary of State, as well as several major counties, argued that the Voter Action suit was filed too late to repeal the decision about the voting machines that was made in December 2005. Most of the touch-screen voting devices had already been purchased, and it was too late to replace them in time for the September 2006 primary election.211 However, just as the legislative session was ending, the Arizona legislature passed a law (S.B. 1557) requiring VVPAT and audits, which was signed into law by the governor in June 2006. In July 2006, a group of activists, including anti-DRE machine advocates and computer experts, filed a lawsuit against Georgia Secretary of State Cathy Cox, Governor Sonny Perdue, and the state Election Board, claiming that the state’s touch-screen voting machines violate the requirement in the state constitution that elections be conducted by secret ballot, and protested the state’s lack of a VVPAT requirement. The group aims to get the court to order the state to stop using the touch-screen equipment in the November 2006 election in favor of equipment that produces a paper trail. The state has announced plans to experiment with paper trail equipment in November 2006.212 Several states are contemplating adopting VVPAT legislation. In 2006, the Wisconsin legislature passed paper trail legislation in the form of Act 92 (AB 627), which “requires that an electronic voting machine generate a complete, permanent paper record showing all votes cast by each elector that is verifiable by the elector, by either visual or nonvisual means (as appropriate), before the elector leaves the voting area.” Act 92 further stipulates “if electronic voting machines are used at an election, any recount of votes cast on such machines must be performed using the permanent paper record of the votes cast generated by the machines.”213 Pennsylvania does not require a paper trail. However, the state does require an audit trail that must be in a technology other than the original technology of the voting machine. Additionally, the state is currently considering HB 2000/SB 977, bills requiring that voting machines purchased with HAVA funds produce or incorporate a voter-verifiable paper ballot. These bills appear to be stuck in committee at present, and several citizen groups are advocating for their adoption. At the 51 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   same time, Voter Action has sued the state to stop it from using electronic voting machines without a paper trail.214 As a backup, Allegheny County will also print optical scan ballots during the upcoming May primary. Voters at sites with long lines will have the option of using the ballots, which resemble fill-in-the-blank standardized tests. When the polls close, workers will bring the ballots to a central location for counting.215 52 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   RECOMMENDATIONS Registration After the 2000 election, researchers and elections officials cited problems with voter registration as the number one challenge to voting. In 2004, voter registration problems were exacerbated by the use of technicalities to reject registration applications, insufficient protocols for notification and correction of applications, and the continued wide gap between the registration deadline and Election Day. In most cases, these problems continue and in some cases have been made worse by new restrictions and barriers to voter registration. Recommended reforms • Clarify what must be on the registration form in order for it to be accepted. In order to avoid situations such as occurred in 2004 in places like Florida where registrations were rejected for failure to check off a redundant citizenship box, states should make it uniform and clear what must be included for a registration to be accepted as complete. • Improve procedures for notifying voters of incomplete registration forms. When voters make mistakes or omit vital information on voter registration forms, states must have procedures in place that allow for officials to promptly and effectively advise them of the problems and allow them to make any corrections or amendments necessary. Voters should have the opportunity to correct and/or amend registration forms, even after the voter registration deadline has passed. • Remove barriers to registration, such as proof of citizenship requirements. Arizona now requires all voters to prove their citizenship in order to register to vote. This has already resulted in the rejection of registrations of eligible voters. It is doubtful that many of these voters will be able or willing to go through additional hoops to try to register once they have been rejected. This requirement and others like it under consideration are unnecessary and will reduce and deter voter participation. • Remove barriers to registration such as unduly harsh restrictions on third party voter registration drives. Because the government does very little to actively ensure that Americans are registered to vote, third parties are an essential component in the effort to get voters involved in the political process, particularly voters from marginalized 53 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   communities. Additionally, these third party groups play an important role in monitoring the processing of registration applications through internal verification checks of the forms and tracking of the registration process at elections offices. Laws that place restrictions that are so harsh on these groups that they effectively put them out of commission must not stand. • Implement Election Day Registration. Many of the problems associated with the voter registration process could be avoided if voters had the option to register to vote on the day of the election, as is currently the case in 6 states. As an added bonus, those states with EDR consistently show substantially higher participation rates than the rest of the country, further demonstrating the extent to which early registration deadlines reduce voter participation. • Ensure full implementation of NVRA, especially public agency requirements. NVRA was passed, in part, to make registration easier and more accessible to a wider range of Americans. One way this was to be achieved was for public agencies serving various communities to offer voter registration on-site. States must live up to their obligations to ensure that these agencies are complying with the law and providing voter registration opportunities for those who may not otherwise be familiar with the voter registration process. • Remove barriers to voting for citizens with felony convictions. Nearly 5 million Americans cannot vote due to a felony conviction. In 13 states, people with felony convictions can lose the right to vote permanently. In most other states, persons on probation and on parole are denied the vote, keeping substantial numbers of people from the polls, while many other citizens remain effectively disfranchised either by misinformation about their voting rights or by unwarranted bureaucratic hurdles. Voter Databases When the Help America Vote Act was passed, the statewide voter registration database was considered an important tool in ensuring that all eligible voters but only eligible voters are registered and able to vote. These databases still hold enormous promise, but not if they are used ineffectively or as a means to take voters off the rolls injudiciously. With respect to use of databases, some states have nonexistent or poor procedures and others have rules that are likely to lead to disenfranchisement. 54 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   Recommended reforms • Fair and effective matching protocols. No matter how well a state’s database is constructed, it will only work as well as the humans who are operating it and the rules that govern its administration. As a result, standards for matching voter registration information with information in current databases must be both fair and effective and not so technical that they serve to disenfranchise voters rather than to ensure clean lists. Specifically, states should not impose exact match standards, but rather employ substantial match standards. • No removal without verification and notification of the voter, including persons convicted of felonies. Since databases rely on the people who are operating them, mistakes will be made. As a result, no voter should be removed from the list without being given timely and effective notification of the pending removal and an opportunity to contest that removal. • Automatic re-enfranchisement of exfelons. While automatic re-enfranchisement of ex-felons is important as a matter of maintaining democratic values, it also will serve to simplify and streamline election administration. If ex-felons are automatically re-enfranchised after completing their sentences, administrators will be freed of the burdens of tracking an ex-felon’s multiple possible eligibility statuses in an attempt to determine whether he or she should be on the list. • Voters should be able to confirm their presence on the voter rolls by phone or on the Internet. Many voter registration problems could be alleviated if voters were able to check easily to ensure that they are registered properly. That way, the voter has the opportunity to proactively address problems that may have occurred with his or her registration in a timely manner and make sure he or she is able to vote. • The technology must be open and must be rigorously tested, with vendors subject to restrictions on partisanship or conflicts of interest. Identification Requirements Should be Limited to Those Mandated by HAVA Many state legislatures, including some identified in this study, have passed or are currently considering passing restrictive voter identification bills that go well beyond what HAVA requires. These bills 55 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   would require all voters to present at least one form of acceptable identification at the polls on Election Day, in many cases mandating that all voters present state-issued photographic identification, before they would be permitted to cast their votes. Such requirements pose significant barriers for millions of Americans and should be rescinded where they have been enacted and prevented from being implemented elsewhere for the following reasons: • They disproportionately impact people of color, rural voters, young people, the homeless, low-income people, the elderly, individuals with disabilities, frequent movers, and persons in large households. A number of studies have documented that certain segments of the population are far less likely to have state-issued identification than others Americans. Long lines at the polling place and long waiting times created by voter ID requirements will prevent many working citizens from having the chance to vote. • Requiring voter identification is equivalent to a poll tax. By requiring voters to provide identification, states are in essence mandating that these voters pay for documents to verify their identities. IDs such as drivers’ licenses, passports, and birth certificates cost money. The documents required to get those IDs also cost money. Not all eligible voters in this country can afford to purchase such pieces of identification. Moreover, not all Americans can take time during working hours to obtain such identification documents. • Voter identification is not an effective means of preventing or catching voter fraud. Claims that fraud is rampant on Election Day are unjustified and unfounded. Individual voter fraud at the polls is rare. Based on recent studies and investigations completed in several states such as Wisconsin and Ohio, evidence suggests that voter fraud is minimal and unlikely to impact election results. In addition, voter ID does not prevent more pernicious election fraud such as voter intimidation, voter suppression, misinformation, vote buying, and other threats to the integrity of elections. Enforce Laws Prohibiting Voter Suppression/Intimidation Efforts to illegally suppress the vote and to intimidate voters continue across the United States. Some efforts push the lines of legality, such as targeted and mass challenges to voters’ registrations and 56 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   voters’ rights to vote at the polls. Others are less subtle, such as distributing fliers with false information about election procedures in minority neighborhoods. Yet states are doing little to address these ongoing problems. More must be done to prevent, punish, and rectify the damage of these activities. Recommended reforms • State and local government must enforce existing laws and prosecute illegal activities intended to intimidate voters or disrupt turnout. Many suppression and intimidation activities continue to take place because those who engage in them believe there will be no repercussions for doing so. Too often, they are right. Sometimes no action is taken, while on occasion these malfeasants are simply told by an administrator to stop engaging in the offensive activity. This is insufficient and unacceptable. • State and local governments must prosecute deceptive practices criminally and have in place emergency procedures to immediately correct the information spread by deliberate misinformation campaigns. The use of deceptive practices during an election should be criminalized and prosecuted aggressively. While it is sometimes impossible to catch the individuals or groups responsible for disseminating fraudulent information immediately, officials can take aggressive steps to quickly and effectively alert the public to the fraud and educate them about accurate election procedures. It is crucial that administrators use all educational and public relations resources at their disposal when such situations arise. • Local and state election officials should allow international and nonpartisan election observers to observe polling places without prior notice or permission, provided they do not disrupt Election Day. In 2004, international observers were told a number of times that they could not conduct their observation activities at a polling site. While concerns about crowding are real, international and nonpartisan observers serve not only to document possible disenfranchising or other illegal activity, but often deter it. They should, within reason, be a welcome part of the process. • States must establish fair standards for challenges. All states should have uniform challenge procedures characterized by transparency and fairness; such procedures must be designed in such a way that they prevent disenfran- 57 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   chisement or voter deterrence. Such standards should include penalties for overtly partisan, racial, ethnic, or otherwise frivolous challenges. States should enact stringent requirements for when a challenge may be made by a challenger at the polls. States should also require pre-election challenges to be filed well ahead of Election Day. Reduce Partisanship and Conflict of Interest in Election Administration To avoid even the appearance of impropriety, government officials in charge of running elections should not be engaged in partisan political campaigns. This occurred in 2000 and 2004, raising the level of voter mistrust in the system. Recommended reforms • Prohibit election administrators from participating in partisan political campaigns. Elected officials should be limited to participation in their own campaigns. For example, the Secretary of State or the county elections director, individuals who are charged with administering and overseeing elections, should not play a role in a partisan campaign for senator or president. • Include nonpartisan and unaffiliated voters in decision-making, poll watching, and other aspects of election administration. By definition, partisan overseers are watching out for their own political party’s interest. The current practice of allowing only partisan participation results in a lack of impartial oversight of the election system. • Establish strict conflict-of-interest laws for all elections officials. Campaign contributions from vendors to election officials, revolving-door arrangements by which election officials become lobbyists for vendors, and other such ethical improprieties erode public confidence in elections and contribute to weak election management. • Establish strong sunshine laws around all decision-making by election officials. Decisions that are subject to public scrutiny better serve the public interest. Fix, Replace, Test, and Maintain Voting Machines The nation still has not fixed the machinery of voting. In 2006, approximately 40 percent of voters will use electronic voting machines that have been subject to questions about their security and reliability. Due to controversies that have erupted 58 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   over these systems, many jurisdictions have yet to meet HAVA’s requirement of one accessible machine per polling place. Elections officials need to take a step back and take another look to determine the best technology for voting that meets the goals of accessibility, accuracy, and security. Recommended reforms • Enable voters with disabilities to vote privately and independently and accommodate citizens for whom English is not their primary language. Voting systems should undergo rigorous testing by those with special needs, and a better public rating system should be devised. • Institute better testing, maintenance, and independent certification processes. While remaining mindful of accessibility and language requirements, voting systems must either incorporate or create an accessible voter-verified paper record that is used in recounts and audits,216 and mandatory random audits must be scheduled. Studies by government, academic, and private-sector experts concur that a significant risk of malfunction or security breach is present in all current voting systems. The only way to safeguard voters’ choices is to conduct extensive testing and auditing prior to and immediately after an election, and to enact stringent security measures regarding the handling of voting machines and software. • Open the process for testing and certification and allow computer security experts access to the voting machine software. Election officials and citizens should have access to published independent evaluations of their voting systems. To ensure voter confidence, testing and certification procedures must be open to public scrutiny. • Ensure that the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and the National Institute for Standards and Technology have sufficient funding for setting standards for voting systems and for updating those standards whenever necessary. Voter confidence is the bedrock of our election system and should not be held hostage to insufficient funding. • Base allocation standards for voting machines on the latest registration numbers and other factors such as demographic data, the length of the ballot, and recent voter turnout. Long lines at the polling place act as a deterrent to voters, effectively disenfranchising those who cannot afford to wait 59 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   due to childcare, work, or other time commitments. All possible efforts must be made to accommodate all voters. The Polling Place: Poll Worker Training and Recruitment, Accessibility, and Voter Education The operation of the polling place is perhaps the most critical element in our voting system. Poll workers are the bedrock of our voting system. Too often in 2004, problems arose and voters were disenfranchised because poll workers were improperly trained or were misinformed. Voters were likewise not fully informed on their rights or on voting procedures, further adding to the confusion. And while HAVA requires every polling place to have accessible voting machines, many voters with disabilities still face barriers due to inaccessible polling places and uninformed poll workers. While some states have made improvements in these areas, more must be done. Recommended reforms • Poll worker training should be rigorous, ensuring that poll workers meet minimum standards for knowledge of election procedures. Such training should cover laws and regulations governing voting and polling places; how to assist non-English speaking voters; how to assist and provide accommodations for voters with disabilities; how to assist voters with various problems (e.g., the voter is not registered, the voter came to the wrong polling place, etc.); and how to operate voting machinery in use at the polling place. • Ensure that there are enough poll workers on Election Day. To ensure an adequate number of poll workers, minimum standards governing the number of poll workers and voting systems per polling place should be set for each jurisdiction. Innovative approaches for recruitment should be explored, including using students and a random system of recruiting citizens (as, for instance, in recruiting for jury duty). • Voters should be provided with information about the process. Voters should receive written information about their voting rights when they register and when they vote. During the three months preceding an election, there should be open training days during which voters can learn how to operate voting equipment. Such training days should be held in accessible public places, such as public schools, shopping malls, and community centers. 60 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   • Polling places should be physically accessible to voters with disabilities. In addition to dealing with obvious barriers like stairways, election officials must also ensure that areas such as entrances and parking areas are fully accessible to persons using wheelchairs, walkers, or other mobility devices, that voting machine controls can be reached by voters in wheelchairs, and that polling place instructions can be easily understood and are available in multiple formats such as Braille, large print, audio, and so on. Provisional ballots should not be used as portable ballots for voters with disabilities, in place of regular ballots. • Poll worker training should cover the rights of people with disabilities as well as ways to provide accommodations in a respectful, dignified way. This training should include matters such as the use of assistants and what constitutes an acceptable signature upon checkin. Poll workers and election officials should consult with people with a variety of disabilities and with disability advocacy organizations before Election Day. Develop Uniform Statewide Provisional Ballots Standards 61 When HAVA was passed, the hope was that provisional ballots would be the safeguard against a voter arriving at a polling place, being told she is not on the voting list, and then being turned away. HAVA’s vagueness in describing how these ballots are to be administered created a number of problems in 2004. This produced a wide range of overly technical and, at times, disenfranchising rules for distributing and counting provisional ballots. Provisional ballots must be fully implemented as a meaningful safety net for voters when there are problems with registration or ID requirements. Recommended reforms • Voters should be allowed to cast a provisional ballot for federal or statewide offices even if, for whatever reason, they are not in their own precinct. In no case should a provisional ballot cast at the wrong precinct but at the right polling site be disqualified. This simply means in many cases that a voter went to the wrong desk in the right school or gym. It is clear that voters not knowing where to vote is a major problem. One of the many national voter hotlines set up during the weeks before Election Day 2004, 1-866- myvote1, received 100,000 phone calls from people trying to find out where Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   62 they were supposed to vote. Voters should not be disenfranchised due to failures in administration. • Provisional ballots should be utilized fairly when a voter does not have required identification. If a voter arrives at the polls without identification, but was required under HAVA to bring ID, election administrators should allow that voter to vote by provisional ballot and make every effort to verify that voter’s eligibility through available databases after the election. If such verification is made, the provisional ballot should be counted. Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   APPENDIX I - (Located at bottom of document)   APPENDIX II STATE PROFILES Please refer to the original article: CLICK HERE ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   1 See http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=EV&pubid=132. 2 “Voting in 2004: A Report to the Nation on America’s Election Process,” The Century Foundation, Common Cause Education Fund, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, 7 December 2004, http:// www.commoncause.org/atf/cf/{FB3C17E2-CDD1-4DF6-92BE-BD4429893665}/12-7ConferenceSUMMARY1.pdf. 3 See, for example, Spencer Overton, “Stealing Democracy: The New Politics of Voter Suppression, W.W. Norton & Company, 2006; Brennan Center for Justice Policy briefs at http://www.brennancenter/. org/programs/dem_vr_havaID.html; “Balancing Access and Integrity,” The Century Foundation, 2005; John Pawasarat, The Driver License Status of the Voting Age Population in Wisconsin, Employment and Training Institute, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, June 2005; Tova Andrea Wang, “Voter Fraud and ID: Prove It,” The Century Foundation, 28 July 2005; Order for Preliminary Injunction, Common Cause vs. Billups, Case 4:05-cv-00201-HLM, 18 October 2005. 4 R. Michael Alvarez, “Voter Registration: Past, Present and Future,” Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, Working Paper, June 2005. 5 42 U.S.C. §15483(b)(4)(A)(i)(2002) and 42 U.S.C. §15483(b)(4)(B)(2002). 6 42 U.S.C.§1973gg(2002). 7 Florida Election Law, Title IX, Chapter 97.053. http://election.dos.state.fl.us/publications/pdf/electionLaws.pdf. 8 Diaz v. Hood, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (S.D. Fla. 2004). 9 “Ruling revives challenge of voter form rejections,” St. Petersburg Times, 29 September 2005. 10 HB 1589, FS 97.053, 97.0575, 97.051. 11 “Appeals court rules against Judge King,” Miami Times, 18 October 2005. 12 “Advancement Project disappointed with court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims under the Voting Rights Act and the NVRA,” Press Release, Advancement Project, 23 June 2006. 13 Paul Davenport, “AG: Some licenses don’t prove citizenship for voter registration,” Associated Press, 4 February 2005. 14 “Large number of voter registration forms rejected by county,” Associated Press, 6 May 2005. See also Oscar Abeyta, “Prop. 200 costs 200 their right to vote,” Tucson Citizen, 8 November 2005. 15 Gonzalez v. Arizona, Case No. 2:06-cv-01268-ROS, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/gonzalez.php 16 Mark Morris and Tim Hoover, “U.S. sues Missouri over voter lists,” Kansas City Star, 23 November 2005. 17 Bill Lambrecht and Virginia Young, “U.S. lawsuit says Missouri voter lists are a mess,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 23 November 2005. 18 Kelly Wiese, “Carnahan wants help getting county to join voter list,” Associated Press, 29 March 2006. 19 “Missouri, Boone County agree on voter database,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 17 June 2006. 20 Geoff Dougherty, “Dead voters on rolls, other glitches found in 6 key states,” Chicago Final Edition, 4 December 2004. 21 <http://www.dos.state.fl.us/press/oss/fldosmeetFDdeadline.html> 22 Dara Kam, “County election chiefs worry about state control of voter list, Palm Beach Post, 5 July 2006. 23 Department of State: < http://www.michigan.gov/sos/0,1607,7-127-1633_11976_12001-27157--,00.html> 24 Electionline.org, “Election Reform: What’s Changed, What Hasn’t and Why, 2000-2006,” p. 55. 25 Lisa M. Collins, “In Michigan, even dead vote,” Detroit News, 26 February 2006. 26 “State and Regional: Milwaukee,” Associated Press, 3 January 2006. 27 Judith Davidoff, “Cieslewicz calls voter registration system inefficient,” The Capital Times, 3 July 2006. 28 Patrick Marley, “Election fraud plan to miss fall vote,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 3 August 2006. See also “Lists of dead people, felons won’t be checked this fall,” Associated Press, 4 August 2006. Note: this press coverage emphasizes that several cases of fraud were discovered in the 2004 election, and that these databases are important in protecting the state from voter fraud. While this is true, the extent to which fraud actually threatens elections is quite limited, based on available evidence. In Wisconsin, where several extensive investigations were conducted by the state, the FBI, and the legislative audit bureau after the 2004 election, most major election officials involved agreed that there was no evidence of systematic widespread fraud, and that the few cases in which individuals either intentionally or unintentionally voted illegally was dwarfed by the number of problems that resulted from administrative error. See Phil Brinkman, “Voting fraud in November not a problem in Madison; Nearly all suspect voters turn out to be people who moved or made innocent mistakes,” Wisconsin State Journal, 11 May 2005. And “An Evaluation: Voter Registration,” Legislative Audit Bureau, Madison, Wisconsin. September 2005, p. 50-52. 29 Email correspondence with Kevin Kennedy, Executive Director, State Board of Elections, 29 August 2006. 30 Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.08.520 (2004). 31 S.B. 5743, 59th Leg., Reg, Sess. (Wash. 2005). 32 S.B. 5743, 59th Leg., Reg, Sess. (Wash. 2005). 33 “Washington Supreme Court Reviews Ban on Ex-felon Voting,” Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union of Washington State, 27 June 2006. 34 “Some online voter registrations are faulty,” Associated Press, 30 October 2004. 35 Richard Roesler, “Coalition sues to stop law requiring voter-record matching,” Spokesman Review, 25 May 2006. 36 “Lawsuit predicts widespread voter disenfranchisement in Washington unless new election law is fixed,” Press Release, Brennan Center for Justice, SEIU 775, ACORN, 24 May 2006. Web: http://www/. brennancenter.org/presscenter/releases_2006/pressrelease_2006_0524.html. 37 Gene Johnson, “Judge bars state from enforcing new voter registration law,” The Olympian, 2 August 2006. See also: “Federal judge protects eligible voters in Washington,” Press Release, Brennan Center for Justice, 1 August 2006. http://www.brennancenter.org/presscenter/releases_2006/pressrelease_2006_0801.html. 38 Pennsylvania Department of State, Bureau of Commissions, Elections and Legislation, “Alert Re: Driver’s License and Social Security Data Comparison Processes Required by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA),” 9 August 2006. 39 Minnesota Rules. 8200.9310 Treatment of Voter Registration Applications; Subpart 2: Verification; defined; notification. Accessed < http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/arule/8200/9310.html>. 40 Minnesota Statutes 2005: 201.061 Registration on or before election day. Accessed: http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/stats/201/061.html 41 Jane Musgrave, “Young voters victims of evolving style,” Palm Beach Post, 30 January 2005. 42 Jeff Schweers, “New voter cards part of election reforms,” Florida Today, 17 February 2006. 43 Minnesota Rules: 8200.2900 Deficient Registrations; Notice of Deficient Registrations. 44 “Voting in 2004: A Report to the Nation on America’s Election Process,” The Century Foundation, Common Cause, and Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, 7 December 2004, p.12. 45 “Gov. Bush signs three bills changing election laws,” Associated Pres, 20 June 2005. 46 Jay Weaver, “Voter drive law prompts suit,” The Miami Herald, 19 May 2006. 47 League of Women Voters v. Cobb, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, Case No. 06-21265-CIV-SEITZ/MCALILEY, 28 August 2006. 48 Ohio RSC § 3503.14. Content of forms; persons unable to sign. Accessed: http://onlinedocs.andersonpublishing.com/oh/lpExt.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&cp=PORC. 49 Jim Provance, “Blackwell revises requirements for paid voter registrars,” Toledo Blade, 16 June 2006. 50 M.R. Kropko, “Blackwell revises voter registration rules,” Associated Press, 15 June 2006. 51 Mark Niquette, “Blackwell’s changes to voter registration upheld,” The Columbus Dispatch, 27 June 2006. 52 Project Vote v. Blackwell, Case No. 1:06-cv-01628-KMO, Memorandum and Order, 8 September 2006; “Ohio Voter Registration Rules Thrown Out,” Associated Press, 1 September 2006 53 42 U.S.C.§ 1973gg-5 (6)(C). 54 “Maximizing Voter Registration Opportunities in Human Services Agencies: An Important Responsibility for Agencies and Clients.” Project Vote, Demos, Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now. June 2004. Access: http://www.demos-usa.org/pubs/NVRA%20Guide%202004%206.04.pdf. 55 “Members of Congress urge Justice Department to enforce decade-old voter registration law,” Ascribe Newswire, 20 September 2005. See also Christopher Leonard, “Clay seeks investigation of voter registration law implementation,” Associated Press, 12 October 2005 and “Pelosi urges Attorney General to secure voting rights for all,” U.S. Newswire, 9 November 2005. 56 “The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 on the Administration of Elections for Federal Office, 2003-2004,” A Report to the 109th Congress, United States Election Assistance Commission, 30 June 2005. 57 “Ohio Ignores Requirements of Thirteen Year-Old Federal Voter Registration Law,” Press Release, Demos/NVRI, ACORN, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, 18 May 2006. Access: http:// projectvote.org/newsroom/ohio-ignores-requirements-of-13-year-old-federal-voter-registration-law-voting-rights.html. 58 Ted Wendling, “Blackwell’s dual roles draw fire; Candidate is also top elections official,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, 8 June 2006. 59 Christopher Leonard, “Clay seeks investigation of voter registration law implementation,” Associated Press, 12 October 2005. 60 Jo Mannies, “Clay makes an issue of Motor Voter law,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 14 October 2005. 61 “Ten Years Later: A Promise Unfulfilled. The National Voter Registration Act in Public Assistance Agencies, 1995-2005.” Demos Report. July 2005. http://www.demos.org/pubs/NVRA91305.pdf 62 <http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/DOJHTM.HTM> 63 Brian Cavanaugh, Steve Carbo, Lucy Mayo and Mike Slater, “A Promise Unfulfilled: The National Voter Registration Act in Public Assistance Agencies, 1995-2005,” Demos, Project Vote and ACORN, 14 September 2005, p. 11. 64 Electionline.org Election Reform Hot Topics. “Voter ID Requirements.” Accessed: http://electionline.org/Default.aspx?tabid=364 65 Gonzalez v. Arizona and Navajo Nation v. Brewer, U.S. District Court, District of Arizona, Case No. 2:06-cv-01268-ROS and CV 3:06-1575-PHX-ROS http://www.lawyerscommittee.org/2005website/ publications/press/pdf/prop%20200.pdf 96 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   66 Lake v. Perdue (Case 2006-CV-119207), Order on Plaintiff’s Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, 19 September 2006. 67 Doug Gross, “Election board vote means no photo ID required in November, “ Associated Press, 23 September 2006, at http://www.macon.com/mld/macon/news/politics/15588473.htm. 68 “Analysis of State Databases Reveals Nearly 700,000 Registered Voters Lack Valid Driver’s License or State-Issued Georgia ID,” Georgia Secretary of State Press Release, 19 June 2006. Web Access: http://www.sos.state.ga.us/pressrel/061906.htm. 69 Steve Crawford, “Some in area lack common voter ID; Blacks, those over 64 are the most affected,” The Augusta Chronicle, 24 June 2006. 70 Conversation with Jennifer Owens, Executive Director of Georgia’s League of Women Voters, 30 May 2006. 71 Walter C.Jones, “Cox: Law will lead to more fraud at ballot box,” Florida Times-Union, 13 October 2005. http://www.sos.state.ga.us/misc/cathybio.htm. 72 “Voter ID Legislation 2006,” electionline.org, Election Administration Hot Topics. http://electionline.org/ResourceLibrary/VoterIDLeg2006/tabid/1096/Default.aspx, 23 March 2006. 73 “Analysis of Eligible Voters Potentially Barred from the Polls by Restrictive New Identification Requirements in Missouri Senate Bills Nos. 1014 & 730,” Brennan Center for Justice, NYU School of Law. http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/HAVA/MO%20SB1014%20analysis%20best%20version.pdf. 8 March 2006. 74 Virginia Young, “State starts issuing voter IDs,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 15 June 2006. 75 Justin Ludwig, “No voter (with photo ID) left behind,” The Lake Sun Leader, 26 July 2006. 76 Jackson County v. State of Missouri, Cole County District Court Case No. 06AC-CC00587, Judgment, 14 September 2006. 77 NAACP et al. v. Robin Carnahan et al., U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri, Case No. 06-4200. 78 Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State: http://www.sos.state.mn.us/home/index.asp?page=12&select_faq_by_faq_cat=2#29 79 Patrick Condon, “Judge orders loosened voting restrictions,” Associated Press, 29 October 2004. 80 Brian Bakst, “Minnesota lawmakers seek photo ID requirement for voting,” Associated Press, 26 January 2006. Minnesota House of Representatives: http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/bills/billnum. asp?Billnumber=HF+1443&ls_year=84&session_year=2005&session_number=0&Go.x=32&Go.y=7&Go=Search. 81 Tom Scheck, “Voting bill stirs strong emotions at Capitol,” Minnesota Public Radio, 15 March 2006. and Dane Smith, “Panel OKs bill requiring citizenship proof to vote,” Minneapolis Star Tribune, 16 March 2006. 82 “Voter ID bill advances, but could face dead end,” Associated Press, 10 May 2006. 83 “Bill expands list of acceptable voter ID,” Associated Pres, 5 April 2006. 84 Gilbert Prince, “Democrats threaten suit over House Bill 3,” Call and Post, 8 February 2006. 85 “New law requires Ohio voters to show identification at the polls,” The Toledo Blade, 1 February 2006. See also. “People won’t ID to vote until November, lawmakers say,” The Columbus Dispatch, 27 January ,2006. 86 Electionline.org. <http://www.electionline.org/Default.aspx?tabid=364> 87 <http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/HAVA/svrd/Ohio.pdf> 88 O.R.C. § 3509.03(E)(3). Similar language appears in O.R.C. §§ 3509.031(A)(5)(c) and (B)(5)(c) and §§ 3511.02(A)(5)(c) and (C)(6)(c). See Bethany Sanders, “A Time of Great Change: The Effect of HB3 on League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Blackwell,” Moritz School of Law, Ohio State University, 11 May 2006. 89 Diane Ryder, “Photo ID required to vote in Ohio,” The News-Herald, 31 July 2006. 90 Electionline.org, “Election Reform: What’s Changed, What Hasn’t and Why 2000-2006,” p. 45. < http://www.electionline.org/Portals/1/Publications/2006.annual.report.Final.pdf> 91 Email response from Sarah Jane Bradshaw, Assistant Director, Florida Division of Elections, 17 May 2006. Florida House of Representatives: http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail. aspx?BillId=17314& 92 “Voter ID Laws,” electionline.org, http://www.electionline.org/Default.aspx?tabid=364 93 If the voter does not have photo identification, he or she can sign an affidavit. 94 Opinion No. 6930. Michigan Attorney General Frank J. Kelley. 29 January 1997. Web: http://www.ag.state.mi.us/opinion/datafiles/1990s/op10001.htm 95 Dawson Bell, “Court Jumps Into Dispute Over ID Checks,” Detroit Free Press, 27 April 2006. 96 Charlie Cain, “Court to decide ID question for voters,” The Detroit News, 27 April 2006. 97 Brief of Amici Curiae. “In Re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71.” 98 Personal interview, Ruth Martin, Deputy Field Director, People for the American Way. August 10, 2006. 99 National Conference of State Legislatures. <http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/elections.cfm> 100 http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/polling.aspx 101 Washington Secretary of State, “Frequently Asked Questions on Voting by Mail.” https://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/faq_vote_by_mail.aspx. 102 Steve Schultze, “GOP wants to tighten voting laws,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 4 November 2004.103 103 Phil Brinkman, “Voting fraud in November not a problem in Madison; Nearly all suspect voters turn out to be people who moved or made innocent mistakes,” Wisconsin State Journal, 11 May 2005. 104 Larry Sandler, “Voter ID returns—debate too,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 31 August 2005. 105 National Conference of State Legislatures. http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/elections.cfm. 106 David Pace, “Two-thirds of provisional ballots counted, but wide variations between states,” Associated Press, 18 March 2005. 107 James Drew Blade, “Federal panel analyzes Ohio’s handling of vote,” Toledo Blade, 24 February 2005. 108 108 John McCarthy, “States, counties quarrel over election rules; deadline approaches,” Associated Press, 15 March 2005. 109 Mark Niquette and Jon Craig, “Election reform labeled a priority; Republican lawmakers propose standardizing rules across Ohio for provisional ballots, voter ID,” Columbus Dispatch, 25 January 2005. 110 Jim Provance, “Bill aims to cut absentee voting woes; Ohio Democrats say measure not enough,” Toledo Blade, 18 May 2005. 111 Brandon Keat, “Poor training cited in election problems,” Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, 16 December 2004. 112 Nate Guidry, “Elections panel urges changes; Committee reviewed voting problems from last November,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 19 April 2005. 113 Timothy McNulty, “More extra ballots at polls; May 17 primary details to be listed on county web site,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 28 April 2005. 114 Fritz Wenzel, “Purging of rolls, confusion anger voters; 41% of Nov. 2 provisional ballots axed in Lucas County,” Toledo Blade, 9 January 2005. 115 George Bennett, “Mistake switches winner, loser in Mangonia runoff,” Palm Beach Post, 30 March 2006 and Erika Bolstad, “18 provisional ballots found,” Miami Herald, 25 March 2006. 116 Gregory Roberts, “GOP analysis gives Rossi 100-vote win but Democrats say state law doesn’t allow counting like that,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 20 April 2005. 117 “Process for validating signatures varies widely in Washington,” Associated Press, 20 December 2004. 118 Rachel La Corte, “Counties Flock to Mail-In-Only Ballots,” Associated Pres, 6 June 2005 119 Neil Modie, “Sims Seeks All-Mail Vote System Could Be In Place Next Year,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer,” 21 December 2005 120 SB 5743 Enhancing Voter Registration Recordkeeping. <http://www.leg.wa.gov/wsladm/billinfo1/dspBillSummary.cfm?billnumber=5743&year=2005> 121 Election Day Registration Facts, New York Public Interest Research Group, at http://www.nypirg.org/edr/facts101205.html 122 Current policy in Wisconsin provides that, if the voter has a driver’s license but does not know the number and did not bring it to the polling place, poll workers should allow the voter to vote by provisional ballot. The voter cannot use the last 4 digits of their Social Security Number if they have been issued a WI driver’s license. The provisional ballot will not be counted unless the voter transmits via fax, email, telephone call, or personal visit their driver’s license number to the municipal clerk before 4:00 pm on the day after the election. Wisconsin State Elections Board, http://elections/. state.wi.us/faq_detail.asp?faqid=119&fid=27. Voters who appear at the wrong precinct are not offered a provisional ballot. Wisconsin State Elections Board. <http://165.189.88.185/docview. asp?docid=2028&locid=47> 123 “Solution or Problem? Provisional Ballots in 2004,” electionline.org, Briefing, April 2005. 124 Daniel Tokaji, “DOJ ‘clarifies’ Position on ID and Provisionals,” Equal Vote, 1 September 2005. 125 Secretary of State of Arizona, “Procedure for Proof of Identification at the Polls,” Press Release, 8 September 2005. 126 Shannon McCaffrey, “Georgia to Require Photo ID’s to Vote,” Associated Press, 30 June 2006. 127 Kelly Wiese, “Republicans offer changes in voter ID bill,” Associated Press, 19 April 2006. Missouri Secretary of State: http://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/photoid/faqs.asp. 128 Jim Siegel, “Coming this fall: Voters must show ID at polls,” The Columbus Dispatch, 1 February 2006. 129 Steve Bousquet, “Bill lets long voting lines stand,” St. Petersburg Times, 7 April 2005. 130 “Voting in 2004: A Report to the Nation on America’s Election Process.” The Century Foundation, Common Cause, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, 7 December 2004, p. 23. 131 ARS 16-925 Deceptive mailings; civil penalty. Accessed: http://www.azleg.state.az.us/FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/ars/16/00925.htm&Title=16&DocType=ARS 132 ARS 16-1012 Intimidation of elector by employer; classification. Accessed: http://www.azleg.state.az.us/FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/ars/16/01012.htm&Title=16&DocType=ARS 133 ARS 16-1013 Coercion or intimidation of elector; classification. Accessed: http://www.azleg.state.az.us/FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/ars/16/01013.htm&Title=16&DocType=ARS 134 Minnesota Statutes § 204C.035. 135 SCS/SB 1014 “Modifies law relating to election reform.” http://www.senate.mo.gov/06info/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?SessionType=R&BillID=83706 Accessed April 5, 2006. 136 Tim Hoover, “Missouri approves voter id,” The Kansas City Star, 13 May 2006. See also Tim Hoover, “165 new laws added to Missouri’s books,” The Kansas City Star, 15 July 2006. 137 Interview with Pennsylvania Common Cause Executive Director Barry Kauffman. 97 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   138 Tova Andrea Wang, “Election 2004: A Report Card,” The American Prospect, 4 January 2005. Web: http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleId=8961. 139 “The Fight for Ohio: Fighting Ohio’s Regressive Election Laws and Regulations,” People for the American Way at http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=22161. 140 Julia Malone, “Civil Rights Groups, GOP trade charges of dirty tricks,” Cox News Service, 1 November 2004. 141 “Voter registrations of thousands of U.S. soldiers, homeless challenged in crucial state of Ohio” Associated Press, 28 October 2004. 142 Mark Crispin Miller, “None Dare Call it Stolen: Ohio, the Election, and America’s Servile Press, ” Harper’s Magazine, 1 August 2005. 143 Dane Smith, “Laws: a package of revisions; Bill would rein in partisan challengers,” Star Tribune, 22 March 2005. 144 Minnesota Statutes 2005. 204C.07 Challengers. http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/stats/204C/07.html. 145 Ohio HB 3 Sec. 3503.24. <http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText126/126_HB_3_PS_Y.html>. 146 “Groups Challenge Provision in Ohio,” Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights, National Campaign for Fair Elections, Press Release, 29 August 2006. 147 <http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/pdf/2006_Election_Legislation_Summary.pdf> 148 Email response from Pennsylvania Department of State. 149 Interview with Barry Kauffman, Executive Director of Pennsylvania Common Cause. 150 See summary of Florida election law changes at http://brevardelections.org/05lawch.htm. 151 Art Levine, “Salon’s Shameful Six,” Salon.com, 15 August 2006. 152 ARS 16-591 Grounds for challenging an elector. Accessed: http://www.azleg.state.az.us/FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/ars/16/00591.htm&Title=16&DocType=ARS. 153 “Voting in 2004: A Report to the Nation on America’s Election Process,” The Century Foundation, Common Cause, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights,. December 2004, p. 25. 154 Lisa A. Abraham, “Candidates find missing votes,” Akron Beacon Journal, 1 August 2006. 155 State of Florida HAVA Plan, p. 51. < http://election.dos.state.fl.us/hava/pdf/revisedHAVAplan.pdf> 156 Edward Cardenas, “Teens Get Look Inside Vote Process,” The Detroit News, 2 May 2006. 157 Shabina Khatri, “Macomb Students to Help in School Elections; 2-Hour Session Trains Them to Meet Challenge,” Detroit Free Press, 25 April 2006. 158 “College Student Election Judges.” Minnesota Secretary of State Website: http://www.sos.state.mn.us/home/index.asp?page=463 159 Jerome Sherman, “Whew! A Voter Beats the Machine,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 20 April 2006. 160 Email from Kathy Rogers, Director of Election Administration, Georgia Office of Secretary of State, 11 September 2006. 161 Conversation with Jennifer Owens, Executive Director of Georgia’s League of Women Voters, 30 May 2006. 162 National Conference of State Legislatures. <http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/elections.cfm> 163 Washington Secretary of State, Clearinghouse Elections Notice: “Voters Taking Others Into Poll Booths, “ Addendum to Issue 0511, 8 September 2006. 164 Conversation with Washington Secretary of State’s office, Elections Division, 21 April 2006. 165 Ibid. 166 In a March 4, 2005 letter to the State of Mississippi, DOJ interpreted HAVA’s accessible voting system provision to also provide for accessible polling places: “Section 301(a)(3) means what it says - all polling places in the United States which are used for elections for federal office must have at least one voting system which is accessible to persons with disabilities for use in elections for federal office on and after January 1, 2006. As we have expressed, logically, persons with disabilities must be able to gain access to the polling place in order to be able to use the accessible voting system. Having an accessible voting system does little good if voters cannot enter the polling place to use it. Hence, not only must the voting system be accessible to persons with disabilities but also the polling place where the voting system is located.” Letter from Hans A. von Spakovsky to John W. Eads, at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/hava/msdisability.htm. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Pub. L. 101-336) also imposes accessibility requirements on polling places. 167 Election Protection Archives, November 2, 2004 at http://www.electionprotection2004.org/archives/cat_pennsylvania.html. 168 See the National Conference of State Legislatures, NCSLnet Search, at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/elections.cfm. 169 Email from Harry VanSickle, Commissioner, Bureau of Commissions, Elections and Legislation, Pennsylvania Secretary of State, 12 September 2006. 170 Lanetta J. Williams, “Grant Will Ease Voting for the Handicapped,” The Detroit News, 28 September 2005, p. 13M. 171 Arizona Secretary of State, Press Release, 2 August 2005. 172 SEC 301 (a) 3: ACCESSIBILITY FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES.— The voting system shall— (A) be accessible for individuals with disabilities, including nonvisual accessibility for the blind and visually impaired, in a manner that provides the same opportunity for access and participation (including privacy and independence) as for other voters; (B) satisfy the requirement of subparagraph (A) through the use of at least one direct recording electronic voting system or other voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities at each polling place; 173 Lawrence Norden et al, “The Machinery of Democracy: Protecting Elections in an Electronic World,” Brennan Center for Justice Task Force on Voting System Security, 27 June 2006, http://www.brennancenter/. org/programs/downloads/Full%20Report.pdf. 174 ARS 16-411 Designation of election precincts and polling places; electioneering. Accessed: http://www.azleg.state.az.us/FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/ars/16/00411.htm&Title=16&DocType=ARS. 175 The voting machines are distributed according to the following formula: “Where voting machines are used, precincts shall be equipped by the board of supervisors to provide a minimum of two voting machines for any number up to five hundred registered electors, with one additional voting machine provided for each additional two hundred fifty registered voters, or major fraction thereof, up to one thousand registered voters, one additional voting machine for each additional five hundred registered voters, or major fraction thereof, up to two thousand registered voters, and one additional voting machine for each additional one thousand registered voters, or major fraction thereof, for all over two thousand registered voters.” Each polling place must be provided with a “number of early ballots and printed ballots exceeding by at least one percent the number of registered voters whose names appear on the precinct register of the precinct, city, town, or district for which the ballots are printed.” See ARS 16-430 Number of voting machines in a precinct. And ARS 16-508 Number of ballots furnished each polling place. Web: http://www.azleg.state.az.us/FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/ars/16/00508. htm&Title=16&DocType=ARS 176 Email response from Sarah Jane Bradshaw, Assistant Director, Florida Division of Elections 177 National Conference of State Legislatures. <http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/elections.cfm> 178 Brian Feagans, “Voting machines in short supply,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 30 October 2004. 179 “Long lines for some Georgia early voters, ” CNN, 27 October 2004. Web: http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/10/27/ga.advance.voting/index.html. See also “Long lines and broken machines frustrate voters,” “Georgia: Voters reportedly turned away early from line, ” “Georgia: Long lines, voting machine malfunctions, ” Election Protection; People for the American Way. 2 November 2004. Web: http://www.electionprotection2004.org/archives/cat_georgia.html. See also S. A. Reid,. “Solutions sought for voting lines; Overcrowded polls starts talk of splitting precincts,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 11 November 2004. and Carlos Campos, “Election 2004: Despite advance voting, bet on long lines Tuesday,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 28 October 2004. and Henry Farber, “Election 2004: Early voting slogs to a restless end,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 30 October 2004 and Gayle White, “Election 2004: Energized voters drive big increase in turnout, ” Atlanta Journal-Constitution. 3 November 2004. 180 Email from Kathy Rogers, Director of Election Administration, Georgia Office of Secretary of State, 11 September 2006. 181 Daniel Yee, “New electronic voting rosters get good reviews,” Associated Press, 19 July 2006. 182 “Help America Vote Act: Questions and Answers,” Minnesota Secretary of State, 14 November 2005. Accessed: http://www.sos.state.mn.us/home/index.asp?page=138. 183 Mark Crispin Miller, “None Dare Call it Stolen: Ohio, the Election, and America’s Servile Press,” Harper’s Magazine, 1 August 2005. 184 3506.22 (p. 103) “A Guide to House Bill 3 AS PASSED 1-31-06.” Web: http://www.lwvohio.org/pdf/Guide%20to%20HB3.pdf. 185 “Briefing Paper: Current Election Administration Litigation.” ProjectVote. July 2006. 186 Governor Jim Doyle’s website. < http://www.wisgov.state.wi.us/journal_media_detail.asp?prid=1022&locid=19>. 187 Peter Whoriskey, “Election whistle-blower stymied by vendors,” The Washington Post, 26 March 2006. 188 Tony Bridges, “Test shows voter fraud is possible; Machines are vulnerable to manipulation,” The Tallahassee Democrat, 4 June 2005. See also Bill Cotterell, “Equipment test under fire; Manufacturer says its voting system may now be vulnerable,” The Tallahassee Democrat, 10 June 2005. See also Marc Caputo and Gary Fineout, “New tests fuel doubts about vote machines,” The Miami Herald, 15 December 2005. 189 Jeff Burlew, “Voting-machine company says no thanks, Leon,” The Tallahassee Democrat, 9 March 2006. See also Peter Whriskey, “Election whistle-blower stymied by vendors; After official’s criticism about three firms reject bid for voting machines,” The Washington Post, 26 March 2006. 190 Bill Cotterell, “Missed deadline costs county,” The Tallahassee Democrat, 4 February 2006. 191 Jeff Burlew, “Sancho blasted for lost grant,” The Tallahassee Democrat, 15 February 2006. 192 “Vote-machine feud probed,” The Orlando Sentinel, 30 March 2006. See also Bill Cotterell, “Diebold to discuss selling needed voting equipment,” The Tallahassee Democrat, 30 March 2006. See also Marc Caputo and Gary Fineout, “Crist goes after voting firms,” The Miami Herald, 30 March 2006. 193 Jeff Burlew, “Diebold says it will sell to Leon County,” The Tallahassee Democrat, 14 April 2006. 98 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   194 Gary Fineout, “Machine testing targeted,” The Miami Herald, 9 June 2006. See also Jim Ash, “Sancho blasts new testing rules,” The Tallahassee Democrat, 13 June 2006. 195 Bill Cotterell, “Voting machine advice irks county; Officials: Touting a particular maker is wrong,” The Tallahassee Democrat, 30 March 2005. 196 State News Service, “More Than Half of Michigan’s Cities and Townships Will Soon Have New Optical Scan Voting Equipment,” 19 April 2005. 197 Email response from Bradley Wittman, Director, Election Liaison Division, 12 June 2006. 198 Email response from Bradley Wittman, Director, Election Liaison Division, 12 June 2006. 199 Joel Kurth, “Glitches delay voting in Detroit,” The Detroit News, 4 August 2004. See also David Eggert, “Michigan poll workers report problems with election watchers, voting machines,” Associated Press, 2 November 2004. 200 Darren A. Nichols, “County updates election system,” The Detroit News, 24 June 2005. See also Mary Owen, “Warren: No more pulling the lever in the voting booth,” The Detroit Free Press, 11 November 2004. 201 Patricia Montemurri, “New voting system sought,” The Detroit Free Press, 28 July 2005. 202 “A vexing vote: Mayoral recount can offer lessons, nix gossip.” The Detroit Free Press. November 26, 2005. See also Sarah Karush, “New Detroit city clerk faces first test in August primary, “ Associated Press, 24 July 2006. 203 Emily Gurnon, “Voting machine appeals dropped; 3 counties had fought state over equipment for disabled,” Saint Paul Pioneer Press, 22 March 2006. 204 Finn Bullers, “Casting vote on voting systems, ” The Kansas City Star, 25 December 2005. 205 We note that some machine experts question whether the VVPAT is the most effective means of ensuring the security and accuracy of the voting system, and some further postulate that ultimately any voting system is vulnerable to some form of malfeasance. See, e.g., Ted Selker and Sharon Cohen, “An Active Approach to Voting Verification,” Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, May 2005; The Brennan Center for Justice, supra at note 163. 206 “If the normal procedure includes VVPAT, the [accessible voting system] should provide features that enable voters who are visually impaired and voters with an unwritten language to perform this verification. If state statute designates the paper record produced by the VVPAT to be the official ballot or the determinative record on a recount, then the [accessible voting system] shall provide features that enable visually impaired voters and voters with an unwritten language to review the paper record.” Election Assistance Commission, Voluntary Voting System Guidelines § 7.9.7 (2005). 207 See, e.g. The Brennan Center for Justice, supra at note 163, at 87 (if VVPAT is combined with regular audit); American Council of the Blind, Resolution 2005-16 (acknowledging that a VVPAT would increase voter confidence but must be implemented in a way that preserves accessibility as mandated by HAVA); National Education Association at http://www.nea.org/lac/votingrights/0706ltr.html. http://www.acb.org/resolutions/res2005.html#res2005-16. Other organizations supporting VVPAT include Common Cause, People for the American Way, National Coalition on Black Civic Participation, Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation. 208 “Direct Recording Electronic (DREs).” 3506.05(H)(3)(a)(vi)&(vii)(p.101). “A Guide to House Bill 3 AS PASSED 1-31-06.” Web: http://www.lwvohio.org/pdf/Guide%20to%20HB3.pdf. 209 “Arizona may join fight over touch-screen voting machines, ” Associated Press, 21 March 2006. 210 “Supervisors postpone purchase of electronic voting machines,” Associated Pres, 3 May 2006. See also Blake Morlock, “County mulls voting machines for disabled; Supervisor Elias says he has concerns about the touch-screen devices,” Tucson Citizen, 13 May 2006. 211 Paul Davenport, “Lawsuit challenging voting machines called too late,” Associated Press, 18 May 2006. 212 Carlos Campos, “Lawsuit targets accuracy of electronic voting machines,” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 14 July 2006. See also Doug Gross, “Groups file lawsuit challenging Georgia electronic voting,” Associated Press, 13 July 2006. 213 National Conference of State Legislatures. <http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/elections.cfm 214 “Voter’s Rights Advocates Sue Over Paperless Voting Systems in Pennsylvania,” Associated Press, 16 August 2006 215 Jerome Sherman, “Whew! A Voter Beats the Machine,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 20 April 2006. 216 Some organizations in the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights have not endorsed the use of voter-verified paper records on electronic voting systems. 217 Justin Levitt, Wendy R. Weiser, and Ana Munoz. “Arizona” in “Making the List: Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration,” The Brennan Center for Justice: Voting Rights and Elections Series, 24 March 2006. 218 Arizona Revised Statutes 16-134 (B). 219 “IBM to Develop Arizona Voter Registration Management System; Election Systems and Software to Provide Secure Centralized Database,” IBM Corporation, Press Release, 13 January 2006. 220 Electionline.org, “Assorted Rolls: Statewide Voter Registration Databases under HAVA.” June 2005. http://electionline.org/Portals/1/Assorted%20Rolls.pdf: pg 15. 221 Arizona Revised Statutes 16-579 (A). 222 Arizona Revised Statutes 16-579 (A) Amended by 2004 Proposition 200. 223 223 Justin Levitt, Wendy R. Weiser, and Ana Munoz. “Arizona” in “Making the List: Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration,” The Brennan Center for Justice: Voting Rights and Elections Series, 24 March 2006. Also see Arizona Revised Statutes 16-584 (C) 224 Arizona Revised Statutes 16-584 (E). 225 Electionline.org, “Provisional Ballot Verification.” http://electionline.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1113. 226 Arizona Revised Statutes 16-925, 16-1012, 16-1013, 16-1019. 227 Arizona Revised Statutes 16-552, 16-590, 16-591, 16-592, 16-593, 16-594. 228 Arizona Revised Statutes 16-532. 229 Florida Statutes: Title IX, Chapter 97.053 “Acceptance of voter registration applications.” [2004] http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_ String=&URL=Ch0097/SEC053.HTM&Title=-%3E2006-%3ECh0097-%3ESection%20053#0097.053. 230 Florida Statutes: Title IX, Chapter 98.075 “Other registration list maintenance activities.” [2004] http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_ String=&URL=Ch0098/SEC075.HTM&Title=-%3E2004-%3ECh0098-%3ESection%20075#0098.075. 231 231 Justin Levitt, Wendy R. Weiser, and Ana Munoz. “Florida” in “Making the List: Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration,” The Brennan Center for Justice: Voting Rights and Elections Series, 24 March 2006. Web: http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/HAVA/svrd/Florida.pdf. See also Florida Statutes: Title IX, Chapter 98.075 “Registration records maintenance activities; ineligibility determinations.” http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=Ch0098/SEC075.HTM&Title=-%3E2006-%3ECh0098-%3ESection% 20075#0098.075. 232 Florida Statutes: Title IX, Chapter 98.0977 “Statewide voter registration database; operation and maintenance.” [2004] http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_ Statute&Search_String=&URL=Ch0098/SEC0977.HTM&Title=-%3E2004-%3ECh0098-%3ESection%200977#0098.0977. 233 Florida Statutes: Title IX, Chapter 97.057 “Voter registration by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles.” [2004] http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_ Statute&Search_String=&URL=Ch0097/SEC057.HTM&Title=-%3E2006-%3ECh0097-%3ESection%20057#0097.057 234 Florida Statutes: Title IX, Chapter 97.058 “Voter registration agencies.” [2004] http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=Ch0097/SEC058. HTM&Title=-%3E2004-%3ECh0097-%3ESection%20058#0097.058. 235 “The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 on the Administration of Elections for Federal Office, 2003-2004,” United States Election Assistance Commission, 30 June 2005. 236 Florida Statutes: Title IX, Chapter 97.053 “Acceptance of voter registration applications.” [2006] http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_ String=&URL=Ch0097/SEC053.HTM&Title=-%3E2006-%3ECh0097-%3ESection%20053#0097.053 237 237 Justin Levitt, Wendy R. Weiser, and Ana Munoz. “Florida” in “Making the List: Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration,” The Brennan Center for Justice: Voting Rights and Elections Series, 24 March 2006. Web: http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/HAVA/svrd/Florida.pdf. 238 Florida Statutes: Title IX, Chapter 97.053 “Acceptance of voter registration applications.” [2006] http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_ String=&URL=Ch0097/SEC053.HTM&Title=-%3E2006-%3ECh0097-%3ESection%20053#0097.053 239 Electionline.org, “Statewide Voter Registration Database Status.” http://electionline.org/Default.aspx?tabid=288. 240 Florida Statutes: Title IX, Chapter 97.0575 “Third-party registrations.” http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=Ch0097/SEC0575.HTM&Title=- %3E2005-%3ECh0097-%3ESection%200575#0097.0575. 241 Florida Statutes: Title IX, Chapter 97.057 “Voter registration by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles.” [2006] http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_ Statute&Search_String=&URL=Ch0097/SEC057.HTM&Title=-%3E2006-%3ECh0097-%3ESection%20057#0097.057. and Florida Statutes: Title IX, Chapter 97.058 “Voter registration agencies.” [2006] http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=Ch0097/SEC058.HTM&Title=-%3E2006-%3ECh0097-%3ESection%20058#0097.058. 242 Florida Statute: Title IX, Chapter 101.49 “Procedure of election officers where signatures differ.” [2004] http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_ String=&URL=Ch0101/Sec49.HTM See also Florida Statutes: Title IX, Chapter 97.0535 “Special requirements for certain applicants.” [2004] http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_ mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=Ch0097/Sec0535.HTM. And Florida Statutes: Title IX, Chapter 101.043 “Identification required at polls.” [2004] http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index. cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=Ch0101/SEC043.HTM&Title=-%3E2004-%3ECh0101-%3ESection%20043#0101.043. 243 Electionline.org: “Voter ID Laws.” http://electionline.org/Default.aspx?tabid=364. 244 Florida Statute: Title IX, Chapter 101.111 (3)(b) 2004 245 Florida Statute: Title IX, Chapter 101.048 “Provisional ballots.” [2004] http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=Ch0101/SEC048.HTM&Title=- %3E2006-%3ECh0101-%3ESection%20048#0101.048. 99 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?   246 Florida Statute: Title IX, Chapter 101.048 “Provisional ballots.” [2006.] http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=Ch0101/SEC048.HTM&Title=- %3E2006-%3ECh0101-%3ESection%20048#0101.048. See also National Conference of State Legislatures. NCSLnet Search: Election Reform Legislation. http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/ elections_search.cfm. 247 Ibid 248 Florida Statutes: Title IX, Chapter 104.0515 “Voting rights; deprivation of, or interference with, prohibited; penalty.” [2004] http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_ Statute&Search_String=&URL=Ch0104/SEC0515.HTM&Title=-%3E2004-%3ECh0104-%3ESection%200515#0104.0515. 249 Florida Statutes: Title IX, Chapter 102.014 “Poll worker recruitment and training.” [2004] http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=Ch0102/ SEC014.HTM&Title=-%3E2004-%3ECh0102-%3ESection%20014#0102.014. 250 Florida Statutes: Title IX, Chapter 102.014 “Poll worker recruitment and training.” [2006] http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=Ch0102/ SEC014.HTM&Title=-%3E2006-%3ECh0102-%3ESection%20014#0102.014. 251 Florida Statutes: Title IX, Chapter 101.001 “Precincts and polling places; boundaries.” [2004] http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=Ch0101/ SEC001.HTM&Title=-%3E2004-%3ECh0101-%3ESection%20001#0101.001. 252 Electionline.org, “Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail Laws & Regulations.” http://electionline.org/Default.aspx?tabid=290. 253 Florida Statutes: Title IX, Chapter 101.001 “Precincts and polling places; boundaries.” [2006] http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=Ch0101/ SEC001.HTM&Title=-%3E2006-%3ECh0101-%3ESection%20001#0101.001. 254 Office of the Georgia Secretary of State: http://www.sos.state.ga.us/elections/voter_registration/vra_2003_update.pdf 255 Georgia Code 21-2-220 http://www.legis.state.ga.us/cgi-bin/gl_codes_detail.pl?code=21-2-220 256 Electionline.org, “Assorted Rolls: Statewide Voter Registration Databases Under HAVA,” June 2005. http://electionline.org/Portals/1/EB11.FINAL1.pdf 257 Georgia Code 21-2-222. <http://www.legis.ga.gov/legis/GaCode/data/21-2-222.htm> 258 Carlos Campos, “Legislature 2005: Voters Win Suit Over Registration,” Atlanta Journal Constitution, 2 February 2005, and Schwier v. Cox: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/11th/0511428p.pdf. 259 “Election board faces lawsuit over voter registration rules,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution 17 August 2006. [NAACP, Project Vote, ACORN, and the Coalition for the People’s Agenda have filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of State and the State Election Board.] 260 Georgia Secretary of State website. <http://www.sos.state.ga.us/elections/elections/voter_information/> 261 Atlanta Journal-Constitution, “Feds Should Kill Voter ID Law,” 31 July 2005. 262 electionline.org, “Election Reform: What’s Changed, What Hasn’t and Why, 2000-2006,” p. 46. 263 Georgia Code 21-2-99. http://www.legis.state.ga.us/cgi-bin/gl_codes_detail.pl?code=21-2-99. 264 Georgia Code 21-2-92. http://www.legis.state.ga.us/cgi-bin/gl_codes_detail.pl?code=21-2-92. 265 Carlos Campos, “One-third of provisional votes counted,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 13 November 2004 266 Michigan Election Law §168.495 “Registration affidavit; contents.” http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(lvygipek5vxgku55ic0umua1)/mileg.aspx?page=GetMCLDocument&objectname=mcl-168-495. 267 The Brennan Center for Justice, <http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/HAVA/svrd/Michigan.pdf> 268 Ibid. 269 Department of State: < http://www.michigan.gov/sos/0,1607,7-127-1633_11976_12001-27157--,00.html>. 270 Michigan Office of the Secretary of State, http://www.michigan.gov/sos/0,1607,7-127-1633_8716-27693--,00.html. 271 “Programs to Ensure Accuracy of Voter Lists Making Strides,” PR Newswire, 23March 2006. See also GAO Report Number: GAO-05-478, “Additional Data Could Help State and Local Elections Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists,” Congressional Quarterly Inc., 10 June 2005. 272 Electionline.org, “Voter ID Law,” Web: http://electionline.org/Default.aspx?tabid=364. 273 Charlie Cain, “Court to decide ID question for voters,” The Detroit News, 27April 2006. See also Brief of Amici Curiae, “In Re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71.” 274 Voter Information On Display During Polling Hours: 2 May 2006. < http://www.michigan.gov/documents/ED-126_05-2006_Instrc_for_Voting_153187_7.pdf>. 275 Memo from Terri Lynn Land to City Clerks, “Procedure for handling ‘envelope’ ballots returned to clerk’s office,” 7 October 2004: http://www.michigan.gov/documents/Procedure_Handling_Env2_95243_7.pdf. 276 MCL Act 116 §168.931 “Prohibited conduct; violation as misdemeanor; ‘valuable consideration’ defined.” Web: http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(nr410145iimfmr55n210lqzn)/mileg.aspx?page=getObject& objectName=mcl-168-931. 277 MCL Act 116 § 168.512 “Challenge of elector; affidavit, contents; answering affidavit; cancellation of registration; indiscriminate challenge, penalty.” Web: http://www.legislature.mi.gov/ (nr410145iimfmr55n210lqzn)/mileg.aspx?page=getObject&objectName=mcl-168-512. 278 Maureen Feighan, “County preps for May 2 election; precinct workers get hands-on training on use of optical scanners to speed school results,” The Detroit News, 20 April 2006. 279 Edward Cardenas, “Teens Get Look Inside Vote Process,” The Detroit News, 2 May 2006. 280 Michigan Election Law §168.661(1) and (2): “Precincts using voting machines; number of machines; division or rearrangement of precincts.” http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(lvygipek5vxgku55ic0umua1)/ mileg.aspx?page=GetMCLDocument&objectname=mcl-168-661. 281 Electionline.org, “Voting Systems 2006.” Web: http://electionline.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1099. 282 Electionline.org “Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail Laws and Regulations.” Web: http://electionline.org/Default.aspx?tabid=290. 283 Minnesota Rules. 8200.9310 Treatment of Voter Registration Applications; Subpart 2: Verification; defined; notification. Accessed < http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/arule/8200/9310.html>. 284 Minnesota Rules: 8200.2900 Deficient Registrations; Notice of Deficient Registrations. 285 “Election Reform: What’s Changed, What Hasn’t, and Why, 2000-2006,” Electionline.org Report, 7 February 2006. 286 Electionline.org Briefing: “Holding Form: Voter Registration 2006,” July 2006. http://electionline.org/Portals/1/Publications/ERIPBrief13.final.pdf. See also: Minnesota Statutes §201.061(1): “Registration on or before election day.” http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/data/revisor/statutes/2005/201/061.html. 287 “Ten Years Later: A Promise Unfulfilled. The National Voter Registration Act in Public Assistance Agencies, 1995-2005,” Demos Report, July 2005. 288 Minnesota Statutes 2005: 201.162 Duties of state agencies. 289 Electionline.org: “Statewide Voter Registration Database Status.” http://electionline.org/Default.aspx?tabid=288. 290 Minnesota Office of the Secretary of State http://www.sos.state.mn.us/home/index.asp?page=12&select_faq_by_faq_cat=2#38. 291 Minnesota State Statute 204C.035 < http://www.sos.state.mn.us/home/index.asp?page=224> 292 Minnesota Election Laws 2006. 204C.07 Challengers. http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/stats/204C/07.html. 293 Minnesota Election Laws 2006 204B.25 Training For Election Judges, <http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/stats/204C/07.html> and Office of the Minnesota Secretary ofState: http://www.sos.state.mn.us/home/index.asp?page=511. 294 Minnesota Statutes 204B.19(6). “Election judges; qualifications.” http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/stats/204B/19.html. 295 “College Student Election Judges” Minnesota Secretary of State Website: http://www.sos.state.mn.us/home/index.asp?page=463. 296 “Help America Vote Act: Questions and Answers.” Minnesota Secretary of State, 14 November 2005. Accessed: http://www.sos.state.mn.us/home/index.asp?page=138. 297 Electionline.org, “Election Preview 2004: What’s Changed, What Hasn’t and Why,” http://electionline.org/Portals/1/Publications/Election.preview.2004.report.final.update.pdf. 298 Justin Levitt, Wendy R. Weiser, and Ana Munoz. “Missouri” in “Making the List: Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration,” The Brennan Center for Justice: Voting Rights and Elections Series, 24 March 2006. 299 Ibid 300 Demos, “Ten Years Later, A Promise Unfulfilled: The National Voter Registration Act in Public Assistance Agencies, 1995-2005,” July 2005 301 “Missouri, Boone County Agree on Voter Database,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 17 June 2006. 302 Missouri 2006 Senate Bill 1014: Section 115.203: <http://www.senate.mo.gov/06info/pdf-bill/tat/SB1014.pdf > 303 Missouri Revised Statutes Section 115.427, August 28, 2005 <http://www.moga.mo.gov/statutes/C100-199/1150000427.HTM> 304 “Voter ID Legislation 2006, ”electionline.org, Election Administration Hot Topics. http://electionline.org/ResourceLibrary/VoterIDLeg2006/tabid/1096/Default.aspx, 23 March 2006. 305 (Missouri Code of State Regulations) 15 CSR 30-8.010 (7) http://www.sos.mo.gov/adrules/csr/current/15csr/15c30-8.pdf 306 Missouri: S.B. 1014: MRS 115.159(2). http://www.senate.mo.gov/06info/pdf-bill/tat/SB1014.pdf. 307 Missouri Revised Statutes Section 115.635, 28 August 2005 <http://www.moga.mo.gov/statutes/C100-199/1150000427.HTM> 308 M.R.S. 115.105: “Challengers, how selected, qualifications – challenges, when made – challengers may collect certain information at presidential primary elections.” Web: http://www.moga.mo.gov/statutes/ C100-199/1150000105.HTM. 309 M.R.S. 115.105: “Challengers, how selected, qualifications – challenges, when made – challengers may collect certain information at presidential primary elections.” Web: http://www.moga.mo.gov/statutes/ C100-199/1150000105.HTM. 310 SCS/SB 1014 “Modifies law relating to election reform.” http://www.senate.mo.gov/06info/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?SessionType=R&BillID=83706 Accessed 5 April 2006. 311 Missouri Office of the Secretary of State http://www.sos.mo.gov/pollworker/faqs.asp. 312 Missouri Revised Statutes Section 115.104, 28 August 2005 <http://www.moga.mo.gov/statutes/C100-199/1150000427.HTM> 313 Electionline.org: “Voting Systems 2006”. http://electionline.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1099. See also “Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail Laws and Regulations.” http://electionline.org/Default. aspx?tabid=290. 314 ORC § 3503.14 “Contents of forms; prohibitions; persons unable to sign.” Web: http://onlinedocs.andersonpublishing.com/oh/lpExt.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&cp=PORC. 315 ORC § 3503.15 “Statewide voter registration database.” C(4). Web: http://onlinedocs.andersonpublishing.com/oh/lpExt.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&cp=PORC. 316 ORC § 3503.19 “Methods of registering or changing registration; mailing of confirmation notice.” Web: http://onlinedocs.andersonpublishing.com/oh/lpExt.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&cp=PORC. 317 Nathan Cemenska, “50 Questions for 5 Key States: Ohio,” Election Law @ Mortiz: http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/election06/50-5_ohio.php#1. 318 Electionline.org. “Election Preview 2004: What’s Changed, What Hasn’t And Why.” October 2004. p. 23 < http://electionline.org/Portals/1/Publications/Election.preview.2004.report.final.update.pdf> 319 Ohio State Legislature Amended Substitute House Bill Number 3. <http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText126/126_HB_3_EN_N.html> 320 ORC § 3503.10 “Voter registration programs for designated state agencies, schools, libraries and county treasurers.” Web: http://onlinedocs.andersonpublishing.com/oh/lpExt.dll?f=templates&fn=mainh. htm&cp=PORC. 321 Nathan Cemenska, “50 Questions for 5 Key States: Ohio, ” Election Law @ Mortiz: http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/election06/50-5_ohio.php#1. 322 322 Justin Levitt, Wendy R. Weiser, and Ana Munoz. “Ohio” in “Making the List: Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration,” The Brennan Center for Justice: Voting Rights and Elections Series, 24 March 2006. Web: http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/HAVA/svrd/Ohio.pdf. See also ORC §3503.15 “Statewide voter registration database.” Web: http://onlinedocs/. andersonpublishing.com/oh/lpExt.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&cp=PORC. 323 Nathan Cemenska, “50 Questions for 5 Key States: Ohio,” Election Law @ Mortiz: http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/election06/50-5_ohio.php#1. See also Levitt, Weiser, and Munoz, “Making the List: Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration: Ohio,” 24 March 2006. Web: http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/HAVA/svrd/Ohio.pdf. 324 ORC § 3503.29 “Training program for persons receiving or expecting to receive compensation for registering voters; registration; affirmation to accompany voter registration form.” Web: http://onlinedocs/. andersonpublishing.com/oh/lpExt.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&cp=PORC. And ORC § 3503.10 “Voter registration programs for designated state agencies, schools, libraries and county treasurers.” Web: http://onlinedocs.andersonpublishing.com/oh/lpExt.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&cp=PORC. And ORC § 3503.29 “Training program for persons receiving or expecting to receive compensation for registering voters; registration; affirmation to accompany voter registration form.” Web: http://onlinedocs.andersonpublishing.com/oh/lpExt.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&cp=PORC. 325 ORC § 3599.18 “Misconduct in connection with registration of electors.” Web: http://onlinedocs.andersonpublishing.com/oh/lpExt.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&cp=PORC. 326 “The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 on the Administration of Elections for Federal Office, 2003-2004.” A Report to the 109th Congress, United States Election Assistance Commission, 30 June 2005. 327 “Ohio Ignores Requirements of Thirteen Year-Old Federal Voter Registration Law,” Press Release, Demos/NVRI, ACORN, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, 18. May 2006. Access: http://projectvote.org/newsroom/ohio-ignores-requirements-of-13-year-old-federal-voter-registration-law-voting-rights.html. 328 ORC § 3505.18 “Voting procedure.” 329 Electionline.org “Solution or Problem? Provisional Ballots in 2004. April 2005. < http://electionline.org/Portals/1/Publications/ERIP10Apr05.pdf> 330 Ohio R.C. 3505.181. “Voting by Provisional Ballot.” See also: Ohio Secretary of State website: “Provisional Voting”: http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/PublicAffairs/VoterInfoGuide.aspx?Section=19. 331 ORC § 3505.181. Eligibility to cast provisional ballot. 332 ORC § 3505.181 (C)(1). 333 See, for example, ORC § 3599.43 “Communications purporting to be from boards of elections,” and ORC § 3599.08 “Influencing candidates and voters by publications.” 334 Ohio State Legislature Amended Substitute House Bill Number 3. <http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText126/126_HB_3_EN_N.html> 335 ORC § 3501.27. “Qualifications of precinct election officials and precinct registrars.” 336 National Conference of State Legislatures. http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/elections.cfm 337 ORC § 3501.18. “Division of subdivision into precincts; polling places.” 338 Electionline.org: “Voting Systems 2006.” http://electionline.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1099. See also ORC § 3506.10 and Electionline.org: “Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail Laws & Regulations.” http:// electionline.org/Default.aspx?tabid=290. 339 339 Justin Levitt, Wendy R. Weiser, and Ana Munoz. “Pennsylvania” in “Making the List: Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration,” The Brennan Center for Justice: Voting Rights and Elections Series, 24 March 2006. 340 Ibid. http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/HAVA/svrd/Pennsylvania.pdf 341 341 Justin Levitt, Wendy R. Weiser, and Ana Munoz. “Pennsylvania” in “Making the List: Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration,” The Brennan Center for Justice: Voting Rights and Elections Series, 24 March 2006.. http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/HAVA/svrd/Pennsylvania.pdf 342 Ibid 343 Electionline.org. “Holding Form: Voter Registration 2006.” July 2006. http://electionline.org/Portals/1/Publications/ERIPBrief13.final.pdf 344 Pennsylvania Department of State, Bureau of Commissions, Elections and Legislation, “Alert Re: Driver’s License and Social Security Data Comparison Processes Required by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA),” 9 August 2006. 345 Pennsylvania Department of State, Bureau of Commissions, Elections and Legislation, “Alert Re: Driver’s License and Social Security Data Comparison Processes Required by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA),” 9 August 2006. See also The Brennan Center for Justice, “Pennsylvania Election Officials Reject “No-Match, No Vote” Policy,” Press Release, 10 August 2006. http://www.brennancenter/. org/presscenter/releases_2006/pressrelease_2006_0810.html. 346 http://www.dos.state.pa.us/sure/lib/sure/sure_news_issue_10_final.pdf 347 Pennsylvania Department of State http://www.hava.state.pa.us/hava/cwp/view.asp?a=1189&q=442312 348 Pennsylvania Department of State http://www.hava.state.pa.us/hava/cwp/view.asp?a=1187&q=442284&havaNav=| 349 PA Statutes Title 25: 961.529 http://members.aol.com/StatutesP6/25.Cp.5.5.html. 350 Pennsylvania Department of State http://www.hava.state.pa.us/hava/lib/hava/stateplan/state_plan.pdf. 351 Jerome Sherman,. “Whew! A Voter Beats the Machine!,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 20 April 2006. 352 RCW 29A.08.210. 353 RCW 29A.08.107. http://apps.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=29A.08.107. 354 29A.08.110 355 29A.08.115 Registration by other than auditor or secretary of state. 356 Levitt, Weiser, and Munoz, “Making the List: Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration,” The Brennan Center for Social Justice, 24 March 2006. http://www.brennancenter/. org/programs/downloads/HAVA/svrd/Washington.pdf. 357 Gene Johnson, “Judge bars state from enforcing new voter registration law,” The Olympian, 2 August 2006. See also: “Federal judge protects eligible voters in Washington,” Press Release, The Brennan Center for Justice, 1 August 2006. http://www.brennancenter.org/presscenter/releases_2006/pressrelease_2006_0801.html. 358 Interview with staff at Washington Office of Secretary of State, 25 August 2006. 359 RCW 29A.08.113. 360 RCW 29A.08.625(2) 361 Levitt, Weiser, and Munoz, “Making the List: Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voting Registration, The Brennan Center for Justice, 24 March 2006, p. WA-3. 362 <http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/pdf/2006_Election_Legislation_Summary.pdf> 363 Conversation with King County Elections office, 25 May 2006. 364 Wisconsin State Statute Chapter 6.33 <http://folio.legis.state.wi.us/cgi-bin/om_isapi.dll?clientID=31662679&infobase=stats.nfo&jump=top> 365 Wisconsin State Statute Chapter 6.325 <http://folio.legis.state.wi.us/cgi-bin/om_isapi.dll?clientID=31662679&infobase=stats.nfo&jump=top> 366 The Brennan Center for Justice: <http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/HAVA/svrd/Wisconsin.pdf> 367 Email from Kevin Kennedy, Executive Director, Wisconsin State Election Board, 22 September 2006. 368 2005 Senate Bill 612, Section 37 <http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lc/2_PUBLICATIONS/Other%20Publications/Reports%20By%20Subject/Elections/IM06_04_rw.pdf> 369 Patrick Marley, “Election Fraud Plan to Miss Fall Vote,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 3 August 2006. 370 Election Day Manual p.35, Wisconsin Board of Elections, August 2006 <http://elections.state.wi.us/docview.asp?docid=872&locid=47> 371 Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 12: Prohibited Election Practices. See 12.05 “False representations affecting elections,” and 12.09 “Election threats.” Web: http://folio.legis.state.wi.us/cgi-bin/om_isapi. dll?clientID=34656927&infobase=stats.nfo&jump=top. 372 Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 6, Subsection V. See 6.92 “Inspector making challenge,” 6.925 “Elector making challenge in person,” 6.94 “Challenged elector oath,” and 6.95 “Voting procedure for challenged electors.” Web: http://www.legis.state.wi.us/statutes/Stat0006.pdf. 373 Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 7.315, 101 374 Assembly Bill 518 (2004) < http://www.legis.state.wi.us/2003/data/AB-518.pdf > 375 Email from Kevin Kennedy, Executive Director, Wisconsin State Elections Board, 22 September 2006. 376 Electionline.org: “Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail Laws and Regulations.” Web: http://electionline.org/Default.aspx?tabid=290. 102 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ APPENDIX I 23 states require voting machines to produce a VVPAT (AK, AZ, AR, CA, CO, CT, HI, ID, IL, ME, MO, MT, NV, NJ, NM*, NY*, NC, OH, OR, UT, WA, WV, WI) 4 states require paper-based ballot systems (MI, MN, NH, VT) Of the 23 states that require voting machines to produce a VVPAT, 17 use electronic voting machines in at least one jurisdiction (AK, AZ, AR, CA, CO, HI, IL, MO, NV, NJ, NM, NC, OH, UT, WA, WV, WI) while 6 do not use any electronic voting machines (CT, ID, ME, MT, NY, OR). 15 states and the District of Columbia use electronic voting machines in at least one jurisdiction and do not require VVPATs (DE, DC, FL, GA, IN, IA, KS, KY, LA, MD, PA, SC, TN, TX, VA, WY) 7 states do not use any electronic voting machines and do not have any regulations requiring VVPATs (AL, MA*, NE, ND, OK, RI, SD) Notes: Mississippi, does not require VVPATs, but in the 77 counties that received electronic voting machines in 2005, the machines produce a VVPAT. Massachusetts is in the process of selecting an accessible voting system. New Mexico passed a law requiring paper ballot; however, news reports indicate that it is not clear that all 33 counties will have paperbased systems in place by the November 2006 election. New York counties are still in the process of selecting an accessible voting system. Lever voting machines will still be in place for the November 2006 election. From Electionline.org 63 Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the Problems of 2004?